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The deepest report: Bitmain's self-help history

The deepest report: Bitmain's self-help history
The original intention of this article is to let readers understand the causes and consequences of Bitmain internal fighting, but after writing it, I found that it is not so much internal fighting as it is a long history of self-help.
The story is very long. Let's adjust the timeline to the eve of December 17, 2018. That was one of Bitmain's most critical moments and the beginning of a series of subsequent stories.
1. Self-immolation In September 2018, Bitmain's financial department warned management that the company's cash flow has become very tight and operating costs must be reduced to allow the company to continue. The blockchain unicorn, which is valued at more than 15 billion U.S. dollars, is crippled in the run and struggling to break the corner.
In 2017, Bitmain made a profit of 1 billion US dollars In the first half of 2018, Bitmain made a profit of 1 billion US dollars Three rounds of financing, a total of 800 million US dollars Net assets should exceed 3 billion U.S. dollars In September 2018, Bitmain had tight cash flow and was on the verge of bankruptcy
A simple comparison, it is not difficult to see that Bitmain's ability to make money is incredible, and its ability to burn money is even more extreme.
How does Bitmain burn money? Do you pour cash into gasoline and burn it, or hire a lot of employees to stuff the banknotes one by one into the shredder? The actual situation is closer to the latter.
The following data can help readers quickly learn Bitmain's money burning skills.
At the beginning of 2018, the entire cryptocurrency market has entered a bear market, but Bitmain's monthly operating costs have been rising wildly. Operating costs have risen from 10 million US dollars at the beginning of the year to 50 million US dollars at the end of the year.
Large-scale expansion of the R&D team is one of the main reasons. The HR who once worked at Bitmain revealed that the company once hired more than 50 employees a day and nearly 500 employees a month. Even so, it was criticized for its slow recruitment speed. The cash consumption in this area is approximately $250 million.
Operating costs are just the tip of the iceberg. Excessive chip trial production can become a classic case of project management courses. Readers who pay attention to Cryptocurrency mining can easily find that Bitmain is still working hard to clear the inventory of Antminer S9 in 2019. As the co-CEO, Ketuan Zhan did not listen to the advice or even warnings of the Finance Department, insisting on the implementation of Excessive chip trial production, resulting in a large accumulation of inventory and tight capital turnover. Another CEO, Jihan Wu, once revealed that the loss of Excessive chip trial production to the company was approximately US$1.5 billion.
Large-scale expansion of the R&D team is one of the main reasons. The HR who once worked at Bitmain revealed that the company once hired more than 50 employees a day and nearly 500 employees a month. Even so, it was criticized for its slow recruitment speed. The cash consumption in this area is approximately $250 million.
The BM1393 chip incident is even more incredible. Chip expert Ketuan Zhan invested a lot of money on a failed chip, and finally failed again. From 2017 to 2018, Bitmain has failed Trial production of mining machine chips at least 4 times, including 16nm, 12nm and 10nm chips, of which 16nm Trial production failed twice, thus losing at least US$1.2 billion.
It is rumored that Bitmain still holds a billion U.S. dollars worth of cryptocurrency in a state of floating loss. In view of the rebound in the market in 2020, we will not comment temporarily, waiting for the correct answer from the cryptocurrency market. But the losses pointed out in the previous article are all irreversible.
2. Sole power
In September 2018, Bitmain's management realized the seriousness of the problem. It turned out that the company's money could be squandered. As a result, the management began to discuss self-help plans, and the most reasonable and effective way was obviously to lay off employees.
The probation period for newly hired employees at Bitmain is half a year, and the probationary salary is 100% of the official salary, there is no difference. Once layoffs are made, new employees who have not passed the probationary period will be the main layoff targets. The department managed by Ketuan Zhan will face large-scale layoffs. The layoff plan is strongly opposed by Ketuan Zhan. Bitmain can only temporarily abandon the layoffs and replace it with continuous reductions. For marketing and travel expenses, a budget committee was established to strictly approve every expenditure. At the same time, employee benefits, such as reimbursement of taxi expenses, breakfast supply, snacks and drinks, etc., have also been abolished, and even the tradition of giving employees 400 yuan worth of BTC/BCH every month has been stopped.
In the face of huge cash flow pressure, trivial savings is obviously of no avail. Soon, the management again discussed the layoff plan, and it has reached the point where it has to be laid off.
In December 2018, Jihan Wu began to organize all entrepreneurial veterans and business backbones to persuade Ketuan Zhan to agree to layoffs, but Ketuan Zhan still insisted not to layoffs. The persuasion process was very unsuccessful. After many meetings and intense debates, Bitmain executives were caught in a dilemma of wasting time with Ketuan Zhan.
In this process, the shortcomings of the dual CEO system began to appear, and the relationship between the two CEOs gradually deteriorated.
On the night of December 16th, Ketuan Zhan reconvened the management meeting, and more than 30 managements who were present were asked to hand over their mobile phones. At this time, Jihan Wu was on a business trip in Hong Kong and was busy with listing related work.
In the meeting, Ketuan Zhan's core content was three items:
(1) Bitmain cannot have two CEOs, only one CEO and must be Ketuan Zhan. Ketuan Zhan said that he met an old leader during a business trip. He hadn't seen each other for many years. The old leader suggested that the company can only have one CEO, and it must be him. Ketuan Zhan feels that this is a kind of fate, an opportunity given by God.
(2) Ketuan Zhan believes that the company's cash flow problems, the biggest responsibility is the inability of the financial department. To prove his point, Ketuan Zhan announced Bitmain's financial data at the meeting. In the evening, employees in Taiwan began to post messages on social media, saying that the company's capital chain was broken and the top management was split.
(3) If Ketuan Zhan is not supported, the option will be cancelled and the equity will be voided.
Hearing about this, Jihan Wu, who lives in Hong Kong, sent a WeChat message to the management who are attending the meeting.

https://preview.redd.it/zkj2d44tqid51.jpg?width=1080&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=9251c1f7308e155d7911d5969e71091a5ad5e14a
On the afternoon of December 17, 2018, Jihan Wu returned to Beijing to negotiate with Ketuan Zhan all night, and finally reached a consensus in the early morning. Bitmain co-founder Yuesheng Ge announced the results of the negotiations. Jihan Wu and Ketuan Zhan ceased to serve as CEOs, and Haichao Wang served as CEO. Jihan Wu voluntarily backed down and Ketuan Zhan served as chairman.
The "12.17 Incident" had a very bad impact on Bitmain, especially the disclosure of Bitmain's financial status, which caused vendors to start dunning. The loan that had just been negotiated with the Bank of Beijing was cancelled the next day. Jihan Wu's resignation as CEO caused an uproar in the industry, and it became a hot topic among Cryptocurrency mining, blockchain practitioners, and investor communities. The media focused their interpretation on Bitmain's series of incidents, and generally looked down upon its ongoing Hong Kong IPO, believing that the high-level changes had already signaled the failure of the IPO in advance.
On Christmas December 24, 2018, Bitmain finally began to implement the layoff plan. This long-delayed “correct decision” was achieved after a stalemate for nearly three months. The AI ​​teams in Beijing, Singapore, Taiwan, and Shanghai have laid off more than 50% of their employees. The Israeli R&D center was closed and Shenzhen New Species Technology Co., Ltd., which had been acquired for only ten months, was dissolved, and all employees were laid off. Copernicus, Bitmain's top blockchain development team, was not spared and was wiped out in this layoff. Copernicus and some of the laid-off employees joined the new company Matrixport co-founded by Jihan Wu and Yuesheng Ge, headquartered in Singapore.
3. Past events when starting a business
After the "12.17 Incident", Jihan Wu gradually faded out of Bitmain's management affairs and turned his attention to the IPO and new company. And this is one of Jihan Wu's major mistakes, he began to let Ketuan Zhan manage Bitmain alone.
In fact, as early as 2013, Jihan Wu planted hidden dangers.
Jihan Wu, an investment banker, was the earliest translator of the Bitcoin white paper. He began to get involved in the cryptocurrency mining industry in 2012. The disappearance of Kaomao and Nangua Zhang's ticket skipping led Jihan Wu to decide to develop his own chip.
In 2013, Jihan Wu established his own mining machine company. Together with Yuesheng Ge, who was only 20 years old, he found Ketuan Zhan, an integrated circuit designer of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to create the protagonist of this article, and later the digital Cryptocurrency mining giant, Bitmain.
Jihan Wu promised Ketuan Zhan that every time a mining machine chip was successfully developed, he would give some shares to the Ketuan Zhan team. At that time, the company founded by Ketuan Zhan was on the eve of falling apart. In order to regroup the team, Ketuan Zhan promised to share half of his shares with the team members. Unfortunately, this is just a bad check. With the rapid development of Bitmain and higher and higher valuations, the expanding Ketuan Zhan almost monopolized all the shares.
Like many startups, Bitmain encountered many difficulties in its early days, and many jobs had to be done by the boss. For example, in the chip design and production process in the second half of 2013, Bitmain was caught in a dilemma of insufficient funds. Jihan Wu personally raised funds and met with TSMC’s sales to persuade TSMC to accept the production needs of a start-up company. Jihan Wu also participated in the selection of the thermodynamic parameters of the heat sink in the Antminer S1.
In 2014, Jihan Wu discovered that this company was independently operated by Ketuan Zhan, which had huge problems. Forcing Jihan Wu to continue to participate in company management.
At that time, Bitmain's mining machine chips had just achieved a certain lead in the standard design process. Jihan Wu believes that the next step must be to develop full customization technology, but Ketuan Zhan plans to invest resources in the research of mobile payment chips.
Ketuan Zhan met a mysterious person from the Party Central Security Bureau who claimed to be able to manipulate the Party Central Committee’s decision-making process for the next generation of mobile payment cryptography standards, but this direction is likely to lead to the fact that Bitmain has just gained the lead in the mining machine market. Regained.
Jihan Wu said that as a graduate of the School of Economics, with a little memory of his high school stage and the knowledge reserve of a computer technology amateur, he retrieves various materials and papers every day, learns theories related to full customization, and goes to Ketuan Zhan conducts persuasion work there.
Fortunately, in the direction of full customization technology, Ketuan Zhan finally listened to Jihan Wu's opinion. Bitmain quickly integrated the technical experts from the United States and Russia introduced by Jihan Wu, which greatly improved the design level of chips and complete machines.
In 2015, Jihan Wu suggested that Ketuan Zhan consider the direction of artificial intelligence. But Ketuan Zhan is not here, he prefers the CPU direction. After staying asleep at night, coupled with in-depth analysis by the Bitmain investment team, Ketuan Zhan finally agreed with this direction. It is a pity that after the Tianshi Chen brothers made major breakthroughs in theory and practice, Bitmain officially invested in the relevant direction, and it was still a step behind.
In the two years from 2016 to 2017, Bitmain's business performance has achieved rapid development, becoming a unique super unicorn in the blockchain industry. According to Froth & Sullivan, in 2017, Bitmain Technology Holdings was the second largest fabless chip design company in China and the tenth largest fabless chip design company in the world, and the fourth largest fabless ASIC chip design company in the world, accounting for 74.5% of global cryptocurrency market share.
However, the huge crisis has long been buried in the early days of entrepreneurship.
Ketuan Zhan's decision on major directions revealed his weakness of extremely lack of business understanding. But every mistake he made was blocked by the company's core employees. His overconfidence in his management ability led to the gradual intensification of conflicts, and the management differences between the two founders became more serious.
4.The giant gets lost
The contradiction between the two broke out on December 17, 2018. Ketuan Zhan used extreme means to force the management to compromise with him by canceling the option, so as to achieve the goal of sole control of the company. Jihan Wu returned to Beijing from Hong Kong overnight and negotiated with Ketuan Zhan all night. In the end, the two resigned as CEO. Jihan Wu retired. Ketuan Zhan has the exclusive rights of chairman in exchange for the implementation of the layoff plan.
Jihan Wu's voluntary retreat has intensified Ketuan Zhan's management to do whatever he wants.
A Bitmain employee commented on Ketuan Zhan's management skills, summed up in two letters-SM.
After becoming the sole helm of the company, Ketuan Zhan quickly "rectified" the department in charge of Jihan Wu as the chairman of the board. He guided the sales of mining machines at the dinner, and pointed out that the sales performance is not due to the sales staff. Ability is strong, but the company provides opportunities. Take two sales leaders as examples, saying that if the company hadn't given the opportunity, they would still be losers. In addition, Ketuan Zhan also instructed the sales staff on how to toast and imparted the wine table culture and experience.
After the meal, Ketuan Zhan came to the conclusion that the quality of Bitmain sales staff was too poor, and Huawei’s blood needs to be injected to drive the company’s progress. Soon, the marketing and sales director from Huawei officially took over Bitmain, opening the era of brand premium for Antminer.
In order to further understand and guide the sales work, Ketuan Zhan asked to meet the customers with the sales staff. During the negotiation process, Ketuan Zhan had a heated discussion with customers on the issue of Chinese and Western medicine, and had also forced the sales staff to be able to ship 10,000 machines due to insufficient production capacity.
Although the requirements for sales personnel are strict, Ketuan Zhan has provided a lot of convenience for "Mainland Ark". In addition to selling mining machines at a more favorable price, Bitmain's mining machines are also hosted in Ming Wang at a higher price than the market price. Mine. It is reported that both Ketuan Zhan and Ming Wang are shareholders of Ark.
The new sales strategy of Huawei's executives has also brought very obvious changes to Bitmain. The self-righteous brand premium reduces the price-performance ratio of Antminer, causing competing products to eat away at Bitmain's market share. Later, Bitmain found that the strategy was wrong and started to cut prices, and found that the mining machine market was saturated and the purchase demand of miners had decreased.
More dangerous than the sales strategy is that the technical advantages of Antminer are being chased by competing products, and even overtaken. At the same time, the two mining pools under Bitmain also lost their first and second positions. The AI ​​business, which Jihan Wu placed high hopes and Ketuan Zhan personally supervised, became a laughing stock in the industry. Not only did it fail to make a profit, it almost brought down Bitmain.
Blindly introducing senior executives from Huawei to occupy important positions completely destroys the company's internal cultural foundation. The bureaucracy within Bitmain began to corrode from high-level employees to ordinary employees. Ketuan Zhan is not aware of this. He is still keen on recruiting Huawei employees, imitating Huawei's organizational structure and strategy, letting HR do sales and R&D personnel to do HR.
The organizational structure adjustment in October 2019 was the fuse for Ketuan Zhan to completely anger Bitmain management. This time, Ketuan Zhan completely marginalized Bitmain’s veteran employees, and suddenly promoted some of the “airborne soldiers” who had just joined the company to the position of person in charge, which caused the former person in charge to report to the new employees. The two managers who were originally equal The hierarchy becomes the subordinate relationship, the operation and development of different business lines are merged into a large department, the upward reporting process becomes more cumbersome, and the relationship between employees becomes delicate.
5. Headwind
On October 29, 2019, Jihan Wu urgently held a staff meeting. Prior to this, the legal representative of Beijing Bitmain has been changed to Jihan Wu, including the parent companies Hong Kong Bitmain and Cayman Bitmain. Jihan Wu stood in the lobby of Building 25, B1, announcing that Ketuan Zhan has been relieved of all duties. Any employee in the Bitmain Group shall no longer execute Ketuan Zhan’s instructions and participate in any meetings convened by Ketuan Zhan. If there is any violation, the company will demotion and expel the company based on the severity of the circumstances. If losses are caused to the company, the company will be held accountable.
Jihan Wu's speech is very long, which can be summarized as follows:
(1) Ketuan Zhan has been relieved of all duties. Also expelled from the original Huawei company HR Zhi Wang introduced by Ketuan Zhan at the end of 2018. Zhi Wang’s reputation on Bitmain was extremely poor and was ridiculed by employees as "nine thousand years" (In ancient China, the emperor was called "ten thousand years old", and the prince was "eight thousand years old." However, in the Ming Dynasty, there was an eunuch who caused harm to the country and the people. He called himself "nine thousand years old", meaning that he was only A little lower than the emperor's level).
(2) Ketuan Zhan's ability to control the company's option incentive plan has disappeared, and it is no longer possible to cancel employees' options at will.
(3) The organizational structure adjustment plan led by Ketuan Zhan was suspended.
(4) We are optimistic about the future of AI business, but the premise is that the main business can continue to make profits in order to support the company's continued investment in AI business.
In the speech, Jihan Wu also told employees the whole story of the "12.17 Incident" and bluntly said that the company is not in good condition. If no measures are taken, Bitmain is likely to go bankrupt in three quarters and he must come back to save the company.
At this time, Ketuan Zhan, who was on a business trip in Shenzhen, finally experienced the situation of Jihan Wu in the "12.17 Incident".
After the official return, Jihan Wu began to clearly point out the company's various problems in operation and management, and went deep into each business line to understand the situation. In the mining machine sales department meeting, employees spoke enthusiastically, reflecting on the difficulties and opinions encountered in the work, the marketing and sales director from Huawei asked with a surprised look, "Why didn't these issues be reported to me before?", and soon , The director was interviewed and "voluntarily resigned."
On November 2, 2019, Jihan Wu announced a salary increase for all employees. Bitmain’s last salary increase dates back to 2018. In principle, Bitmain has two salary increases every year.
On November 7, 2019, Ketuan Zhan spoke on social media for the first time, describing his hardship in starting a business, and condemning Jihan Wu for “stabbing a knife in the back”. At the end of the article, he also set himself a KPI for 2020, that is, the mining machine market share will reach 90%, and the AI ​​business will earn 1 billion.
But Ketuan Zhan's majestic plan did not make Bitmain employees feel emotional, but ridiculed him instead. Employees exposed that he insulted employees, advocated Chinese medicine, believed in Buddhism, drank in meetings, practiced Qigong...
However, there is less than half a year before the halving of Bitcoin production, and the cryptocurrency market shows no signs of recovery, which makes Bitmain management very anxious.
On January 6, 2020, Bitmain ushered in another round of layoffs, with a layoff ratio of about 1/3. This time the layoffs have caused many employees who have just increased their salaries to feel very grieved. On the one hand, they were looking forward to Jihan Wu's return. On the other hand, the compensation for this layoff was less than 18 years.
Ketuan Zhan, who has been unable to enter the Bitmain office area, once again spoke on social media and firmly opposed to layoffs. We do not need to lay off staff and we cannot commit suicide.
During the Spring Festival, Covid-19 broke out. Mainland China has begun to extend the Spring Festival holiday and advocate working from home. Under the chain reaction caused by Covid-19, most companies have chosen to cut salaries or even lay off employees. In the first two months of 2020, China's exports fell by 17%, U.S. stocks were broken four times in a row, Bitcoin plunged 40% in 24 hours on March 12, 2020, and crude oil futures fell by 300% on April 20, 2020...
Obviously, Jihan Wu can't predict, but this layoff seems to be the right decision again. In addition, from January to April 2020, Bitmain's revenue exceeded US$400 million amid the spread of Covid-19 and the collapse of the financial market.
6. Fight to the death
When Jihan Wu tried to get the company back on track, Ketuan Zhan was not helpless. On April 28, 2020, Ketuan Zhan finally rolled back the legal representative of Beijing Bitmain to before October 28, 2019 by repeatedly submitting administrative reconsiderations, and restored his status as a legal representative.
On the morning of May 8, 2020, a piece of news about Bitmain quickly appeared on the real-time hot search rankings, and even dominated the headlines of the day. At window 52 on the second floor of the Haidian District Government Affairs Center, when Ketuan Zhan, the legal person of Beijing Bitmain Company, was receiving the business license, a group of unidentified people snatched the business license from the industrial and commercial administrative staff. A source at the scene said that the number of unidentified people in the group was about 60 people, of which Luyao Liu was directing at the scene.
This is a skillful piece of news. It first leads readers to think that Ketuan Zhan is a victim, using 60 people to grab business licenses as the focus. The masses accused Jihan Wu of lawlessness, but ignored whether the government affairs center could have 60 personnel. As for Hong Kong Bitmain to have the right to appoint a representative to obtain a business license, this is a deeper level of thinking.
The follow-up report restored the real situation at the scene. Only more than ten people were present, and both sides were equipped with security personnel. Bitmain employees also broke the news in the circle of friends, claiming that Ketuan Zhan's bodyguard had injured Bitmain's authorized person, and said in a threatening tone, "Be careful!"
However, the subsequent plot reversal did not have much effect. Jihan Wu's reputation has been greatly affected. From a bloody soldier who rescued the company in trouble to a lawless criminal, it can be said to be a world of war. do not.
Ketuan Zhan, who succeeded in the first battle, began to counterattack Bitmain continuously. On the afternoon of June 3, 2020, Ketuan Zhan led a team to pry open the back door of the Beijing Bitmain office and formally occupied the deserted Beijing headquarters.
On June 4, 2020, Ketuan Zhan called on Bitmain employees to resume work and promised to expand the company's market value to more than US$50 billion within three to five years. After that, Ketuan Zhan began to contact employees by phone, trying to acquire the options in the hands of employees at a valuation of 4 billion US dollars.
Subsequently, Ketuan Zhan recalled Huawei's executives and issued a series of personnel appointments and removals. As of June 9, 2020, Ketuan Zhan has successively eliminated CFO Luyao Liu, and Wenguang Wang, the head of the mining center. Luyao Liu is responsible for controlling Bitmain's IPO plan. He also appointed Yanwu Ma as the HR director, Gang Ren as the head of the mining center, Yonggang Sun as the head of the supply chain, Ling Gu as the financial director, and Bin Zhu as the head of the mining machine business department. Bin Zhu is the senior executive of Huawei who was interviewed and left as mentioned in the previous article. During his tenure, he reduced Antminer’s 90% market share to 50%, and received a large number of complaints from miners. Internal employees once speculated that he might be Compete against the spies sent by the company.
In addition to recalling senior executives of Huawei, Ketuan Zhan also urged employees to return to work. They can receive a bonus of 10,000 yuan when they return to work on the same day, which is only half the next day. Ketuan Zhan showed a very kind side. Every time the elevator door is opened, Ketuan Zhan's hot gaze can be met, shaking hands, taking photos, and receiving money. As there is no personnel information, Ketuan Zhan does not know whether the person receiving the money is a Bitmain employee, and these people did not resume work the next day.
The effect of gentleness was not good, Ketuan Zhan began to force employees to return to work. Seeing that there are still very few respondents, Ketuan Zhan threatened employees through SMS, phone calls, EMS, emails and other harassment, issued multiple threats such as termination of contract, suspension of payment of social insurance, suspension of wages, and even used personal information saved by employees to form a group of employees. Domicile threats, requiring employees to perform "work handover", trying to force employees to return work computers, etc.
On June 10, 2020, the media revealed that Ketuan Zhan had controlled Bitmain's Shenzhen factory and prohibited employees from delivering normal shipments to paid customers, which caused difficulties in the operation of the Bitmain mining machine department.
On June 13, 2020, Hong Kong Bitmain, the parent company of Beijing Bitmain, issued a statement accusing Ketuan Zhan of signing a "Sales Agency Agreement" with the Ark Data Technology Co., Ltd. in which it holds shares, in an attempt to embezzle Beijing Bit's assets.
On June 17, 2020, the media revealed that Ketuan Zhan started selling 14,000 T17+ series mining machines at low prices.
On June 20, 2020, Hong Kong Bitmain officially suspended the supply of chips to the Shenzhen factory.
On July 13, 2020, in the "A Letter to All My colleagues in the Shenzhen Factory" released by Bitmain in Hong Kong, more details were added on the series of Ketuan Zhan's actions in June.
The legal person Feng Zhou of the Shenzhen plant is related to Ketuan Zhan. After being relieved of Ketuan Zhan's post, Jihan Wu flew to Shenzhen to have a long talk with Feng Zhou. Jihan Wu believes that Feng Zhou is the right person to manage the factory and help the company overcome difficulties, and decides to leave Feng Zhou to continue to manage the factory.
This wrong decision staged a story of a farmer and a snake. When Ketuan Zhan began to counterattack Bitmain, Feng Zhou was also quickly instigated and began to assist Ketuan Zhan in seizing customer machines and transferring 17,000 T17 mining machines in the warehouse. Hainan Continental Ark Data Technology Co., Ltd., which is held by Ketuan Zhan, sold them at a low price.
In order to protect the interests of customers, Jihan Wu had to make a compromise and paid the payment for some goods to a bank account controlled by Ketuan Zhan in exchange for delivery. However, after the other party received a payment of 109 million, the delivery stopped. On July 8, 2020, 5600 mining machines have been overdue.
At the same time, the factory defaulted on suppliers’ accounts payable as much as 200 million yuan. Bank acceptance bills issued by the factory, exceeding 36 million yuan, will expire on July 17, and more than 34 million yuan will expire on July 23. It is understood that Ketuan Zhan, after receiving the bank's dunning call, made it clear that he would not repay the loan, which would destroy the company and the entire group's credit in financial institutions.
7、 This is not the end
So far, the power struggle between the founders of Bitmain has been more than half a year. The office building already occupied by Ketuan Zhan is still empty, and most employees choose to work from home. Some chip developers returned to the office with the acquiescence of Jihan Wu and continued to maintain research and development to reduce the impact of infighting on technological iteration and competitiveness.
This giant ship that once stood on top of the supercomputer chip is crashing into the iceberg due to the madness of the former helm. Ketuan Zhan's madness and Jihan Wu's compromise made mistakes again and again. Bitmain tried to save himself many times, but was unable to get out of the black hole.
If the time goes back to that day in 2013, would Jihan Wu and Yuesheng Ge still choose to dial Ketuan Zhan?
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The deepest report: Bitmain's self-help history

The deepest report: Bitmain's self-help history
The original intention of this article is to let readers understand the causes and consequences of Bitmain internal fighting, but after writing it, I found that it is not so much internal fighting as it is a long history of self-help.
The story is very long. Let's adjust the timeline to the eve of December 17, 2018. That was one of Bitmain's most critical moments and the beginning of a series of subsequent stories.
1. Self-immolation In September 2018, Bitmain's financial department warned management that the company's cash flow has become very tight and operating costs must be reduced to allow the company to continue. The blockchain unicorn, which is valued at more than 15 billion U.S. dollars, is crippled in the run and struggling to break the corner.
In 2017, Bitmain made a profit of 1 billion US dollars In the first half of 2018, Bitmain made a profit of 1 billion US dollars Three rounds of financing, a total of 800 million US dollars Net assets should exceed 3 billion U.S. dollars In September 2018, Bitmain had tight cash flow and was on the verge of bankruptcy
A simple comparison, it is not difficult to see that Bitmain's ability to make money is incredible, and its ability to burn money is even more extreme.
How does Bitmain burn money? Do you pour cash into gasoline and burn it, or hire a lot of employees to stuff the banknotes one by one into the shredder? The actual situation is closer to the latter.
The following data can help readers quickly learn Bitmain's money burning skills.
At the beginning of 2018, the entire cryptocurrency market has entered a bear market, but Bitmain's monthly operating costs have been rising wildly. Operating costs have risen from 10 million US dollars at the beginning of the year to 50 million US dollars at the end of the year.
Large-scale expansion of the R&D team is one of the main reasons. The HR who once worked at Bitmain revealed that the company once hired more than 50 employees a day and nearly 500 employees a month. Even so, it was criticized for its slow recruitment speed. The cash consumption in this area is approximately $250 million.
Operating costs are just the tip of the iceberg. Excessive chip trial production can become a classic case of project management courses. Readers who pay attention to Cryptocurrency mining can easily find that Bitmain is still working hard to clear the inventory of Antminer S9 in 2019. As the co-CEO, Ketuan Zhan did not listen to the advice or even warnings of the Finance Department, insisting on the implementation of Excessive chip trial production, resulting in a large accumulation of inventory and tight capital turnover. Another CEO, Jihan Wu, once revealed that the loss of Excessive chip trial production to the company was approximately US$1.5 billion.
Large-scale expansion of the R&D team is one of the main reasons. The HR who once worked at Bitmain revealed that the company once hired more than 50 employees a day and nearly 500 employees a month. Even so, it was criticized for its slow recruitment speed. The cash consumption in this area is approximately $250 million.
The BM1393 chip incident is even more incredible. Chip expert Ketuan Zhan invested a lot of money on a failed chip, and finally failed again. From 2017 to 2018, Bitmain has failed Trial production of mining machine chips at least 4 times, including 16nm, 12nm and 10nm chips, of which 16nm Trial production failed twice, thus losing at least US$1.2 billion.
It is rumored that Bitmain still holds a billion U.S. dollars worth of cryptocurrency in a state of floating loss. In view of the rebound in the market in 2020, we will not comment temporarily, waiting for the correct answer from the cryptocurrency market. But the losses pointed out in the previous article are all irreversible.
2. Sole power
In September 2018, Bitmain's management realized the seriousness of the problem. It turned out that the company's money could be squandered. As a result, the management began to discuss self-help plans, and the most reasonable and effective way was obviously to lay off employees.
The probation period for newly hired employees at Bitmain is half a year, and the probationary salary is 100% of the official salary, there is no difference. Once layoffs are made, new employees who have not passed the probationary period will be the main layoff targets. The department managed by Ketuan Zhan will face large-scale layoffs. The layoff plan is strongly opposed by Ketuan Zhan. Bitmain can only temporarily abandon the layoffs and replace it with continuous reductions. For marketing and travel expenses, a budget committee was established to strictly approve every expenditure. At the same time, employee benefits, such as reimbursement of taxi expenses, breakfast supply, snacks and drinks, etc., have also been abolished, and even the tradition of giving employees 400 yuan worth of BTC/BCH every month has been stopped.
In the face of huge cash flow pressure, trivial savings is obviously of no avail. Soon, the management again discussed the layoff plan, and it has reached the point where it has to be laid off.
In December 2018, Jihan Wu began to organize all entrepreneurial veterans and business backbones to persuade Ketuan Zhan to agree to layoffs, but Ketuan Zhan still insisted not to layoffs. The persuasion process was very unsuccessful. After many meetings and intense debates, Bitmain executives were caught in a dilemma of wasting time with Ketuan Zhan.
In this process, the shortcomings of the dual CEO system began to appear, and the relationship between the two CEOs gradually deteriorated.
On the night of December 16th, Ketuan Zhan reconvened the management meeting, and more than 30 managements who were present were asked to hand over their mobile phones. At this time, Jihan Wu was on a business trip in Hong Kong and was busy with listing related work.
In the meeting, Ketuan Zhan's core content was three items:
(1) Bitmain cannot have two CEOs, only one CEO and must be Ketuan Zhan. Ketuan Zhan said that he met an old leader during a business trip. He hadn't seen each other for many years. The old leader suggested that the company can only have one CEO, and it must be him. Ketuan Zhan feels that this is a kind of fate, an opportunity given by God.
(2) Ketuan Zhan believes that the company's cash flow problems, the biggest responsibility is the inability of the financial department. To prove his point, Ketuan Zhan announced Bitmain's financial data at the meeting. In the evening, employees in Taiwan began to post messages on social media, saying that the company's capital chain was broken and the top management was split.
(3) If Ketuan Zhan is not supported, the option will be cancelled and the equity will be voided.
Hearing about this, Jihan Wu, who lives in Hong Kong, sent a WeChat message to the management who are attending the meeting.

https://preview.redd.it/c5cxea2lqid51.jpg?width=1080&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=3d6a0388408f6b8abe10648e5e4b7a3a5434c821
On the afternoon of December 17, 2018, Jihan Wu returned to Beijing to negotiate with Ketuan Zhan all night, and finally reached a consensus in the early morning. Bitmain co-founder Yuesheng Ge announced the results of the negotiations. Jihan Wu and Ketuan Zhan ceased to serve as CEOs, and Haichao Wang served as CEO. Jihan Wu voluntarily backed down and Ketuan Zhan served as chairman.
The "12.17 Incident" had a very bad impact on Bitmain, especially the disclosure of Bitmain's financial status, which caused vendors to start dunning. The loan that had just been negotiated with the Bank of Beijing was cancelled the next day. Jihan Wu's resignation as CEO caused an uproar in the industry, and it became a hot topic among Cryptocurrency mining, blockchain practitioners, and investor communities. The media focused their interpretation on Bitmain's series of incidents, and generally looked down upon its ongoing Hong Kong IPO, believing that the high-level changes had already signaled the failure of the IPO in advance.
On Christmas December 24, 2018, Bitmain finally began to implement the layoff plan. This long-delayed “correct decision” was achieved after a stalemate for nearly three months. The AI ​​teams in Beijing, Singapore, Taiwan, and Shanghai have laid off more than 50% of their employees. The Israeli R&D center was closed and Shenzhen New Species Technology Co., Ltd., which had been acquired for only ten months, was dissolved, and all employees were laid off. Copernicus, Bitmain's top blockchain development team, was not spared and was wiped out in this layoff. Copernicus and some of the laid-off employees joined the new company Matrixport co-founded by Jihan Wu and Yuesheng Ge, headquartered in Singapore.
3. Past events when starting a business
After the "12.17 Incident", Jihan Wu gradually faded out of Bitmain's management affairs and turned his attention to the IPO and new company. And this is one of Jihan Wu's major mistakes, he began to let Ketuan Zhan manage Bitmain alone.
In fact, as early as 2013, Jihan Wu planted hidden dangers.
Jihan Wu, an investment banker, was the earliest translator of the Bitcoin white paper. He began to get involved in the cryptocurrency mining industry in 2012. The disappearance of Kaomao and Nangua Zhang's ticket skipping led Jihan Wu to decide to develop his own chip.
In 2013, Jihan Wu established his own mining machine company. Together with Yuesheng Ge, who was only 20 years old, he found Ketuan Zhan, an integrated circuit designer of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to create the protagonist of this article, and later the digital Cryptocurrency mining giant, Bitmain.
Jihan Wu promised Ketuan Zhan that every time a mining machine chip was successfully developed, he would give some shares to the Ketuan Zhan team. At that time, the company founded by Ketuan Zhan was on the eve of falling apart. In order to regroup the team, Ketuan Zhan promised to share half of his shares with the team members. Unfortunately, this is just a bad check. With the rapid development of Bitmain and higher and higher valuations, the expanding Ketuan Zhan almost monopolized all the shares.
Like many startups, Bitmain encountered many difficulties in its early days, and many jobs had to be done by the boss. For example, in the chip design and production process in the second half of 2013, Bitmain was caught in a dilemma of insufficient funds. Jihan Wu personally raised funds and met with TSMC’s sales to persuade TSMC to accept the production needs of a start-up company. Jihan Wu also participated in the selection of the thermodynamic parameters of the heat sink in the Antminer S1.
In 2014, Jihan Wu discovered that this company was independently operated by Ketuan Zhan, which had huge problems. Forcing Jihan Wu to continue to participate in company management.
At that time, Bitmain's mining machine chips had just achieved a certain lead in the standard design process. Jihan Wu believes that the next step must be to develop full customization technology, but Ketuan Zhan plans to invest resources in the research of mobile payment chips.
Ketuan Zhan met a mysterious person from the Party Central Security Bureau who claimed to be able to manipulate the Party Central Committee’s decision-making process for the next generation of mobile payment cryptography standards, but this direction is likely to lead to the fact that Bitmain has just gained the lead in the mining machine market. Regained.
Jihan Wu said that as a graduate of the School of Economics, with a little memory of his high school stage and the knowledge reserve of a computer technology amateur, he retrieves various materials and papers every day, learns theories related to full customization, and goes to Ketuan Zhan conducts persuasion work there.
Fortunately, in the direction of full customization technology, Ketuan Zhan finally listened to Jihan Wu's opinion. Bitmain quickly integrated the technical experts from the United States and Russia introduced by Jihan Wu, which greatly improved the design level of chips and complete machines.
In 2015, Jihan Wu suggested that Ketuan Zhan consider the direction of artificial intelligence. But Ketuan Zhan is not here, he prefers the CPU direction. After staying asleep at night, coupled with in-depth analysis by the Bitmain investment team, Ketuan Zhan finally agreed with this direction. It is a pity that after the Tianshi Chen brothers made major breakthroughs in theory and practice, Bitmain officially invested in the relevant direction, and it was still a step behind.
In the two years from 2016 to 2017, Bitmain's business performance has achieved rapid development, becoming a unique super unicorn in the blockchain industry. According to Froth & Sullivan, in 2017, Bitmain Technology Holdings was the second largest fabless chip design company in China and the tenth largest fabless chip design company in the world, and the fourth largest fabless ASIC chip design company in the world, accounting for 74.5% of global cryptocurrency market share.
However, the huge crisis has long been buried in the early days of entrepreneurship.
Ketuan Zhan's decision on major directions revealed his weakness of extremely lack of business understanding. But every mistake he made was blocked by the company's core employees. His overconfidence in his management ability led to the gradual intensification of conflicts, and the management differences between the two founders became more serious.
4.The giant gets lost
The contradiction between the two broke out on December 17, 2018. Ketuan Zhan used extreme means to force the management to compromise with him by canceling the option, so as to achieve the goal of sole control of the company. Jihan Wu returned to Beijing from Hong Kong overnight and negotiated with Ketuan Zhan all night. In the end, the two resigned as CEO. Jihan Wu retired. Ketuan Zhan has the exclusive rights of chairman in exchange for the implementation of the layoff plan.
Jihan Wu's voluntary retreat has intensified Ketuan Zhan's management to do whatever he wants.
A Bitmain employee commented on Ketuan Zhan's management skills, summed up in two letters-SM.
After becoming the sole helm of the company, Ketuan Zhan quickly "rectified" the department in charge of Jihan Wu as the chairman of the board. He guided the sales of mining machines at the dinner, and pointed out that the sales performance is not due to the sales staff. Ability is strong, but the company provides opportunities. Take two sales leaders as examples, saying that if the company hadn't given the opportunity, they would still be losers. In addition, Ketuan Zhan also instructed the sales staff on how to toast and imparted the wine table culture and experience.
After the meal, Ketuan Zhan came to the conclusion that the quality of Bitmain sales staff was too poor, and Huawei’s blood needs to be injected to drive the company’s progress. Soon, the marketing and sales director from Huawei officially took over Bitmain, opening the era of brand premium for Antminer.
In order to further understand and guide the sales work, Ketuan Zhan asked to meet the customers with the sales staff. During the negotiation process, Ketuan Zhan had a heated discussion with customers on the issue of Chinese and Western medicine, and had also forced the sales staff to be able to ship 10,000 machines due to insufficient production capacity.
Although the requirements for sales personnel are strict, Ketuan Zhan has provided a lot of convenience for "Mainland Ark". In addition to selling mining machines at a more favorable price, Bitmain's mining machines are also hosted in Ming Wang at a higher price than the market price. Mine. It is reported that both Ketuan Zhan and Ming Wang are shareholders of Ark.
The new sales strategy of Huawei's executives has also brought very obvious changes to Bitmain. The self-righteous brand premium reduces the price-performance ratio of Antminer, causing competing products to eat away at Bitmain's market share. Later, Bitmain found that the strategy was wrong and started to cut prices, and found that the mining machine market was saturated and the purchase demand of miners had decreased.
More dangerous than the sales strategy is that the technical advantages of Antminer are being chased by competing products, and even overtaken. At the same time, the two mining pools under Bitmain also lost their first and second positions. The AI ​​business, which Jihan Wu placed high hopes and Ketuan Zhan personally supervised, became a laughing stock in the industry. Not only did it fail to make a profit, it almost brought down Bitmain.
Blindly introducing senior executives from Huawei to occupy important positions completely destroys the company's internal cultural foundation. The bureaucracy within Bitmain began to corrode from high-level employees to ordinary employees. Ketuan Zhan is not aware of this. He is still keen on recruiting Huawei employees, imitating Huawei's organizational structure and strategy, letting HR do sales and R&D personnel to do HR.
The organizational structure adjustment in October 2019 was the fuse for Ketuan Zhan to completely anger Bitmain management. This time, Ketuan Zhan completely marginalized Bitmain’s veteran employees, and suddenly promoted some of the “airborne soldiers” who had just joined the company to the position of person in charge, which caused the former person in charge to report to the new employees. The two managers who were originally equal The hierarchy becomes the subordinate relationship, the operation and development of different business lines are merged into a large department, the upward reporting process becomes more cumbersome, and the relationship between employees becomes delicate.
5. Headwind
On October 29, 2019, Jihan Wu urgently held a staff meeting. Prior to this, the legal representative of Beijing Bitmain has been changed to Jihan Wu, including the parent companies Hong Kong Bitmain and Cayman Bitmain. Jihan Wu stood in the lobby of Building 25, B1, announcing that Ketuan Zhan has been relieved of all duties. Any employee in the Bitmain Group shall no longer execute Ketuan Zhan’s instructions and participate in any meetings convened by Ketuan Zhan. If there is any violation, the company will demotion and expel the company based on the severity of the circumstances. If losses are caused to the company, the company will be held accountable.
Jihan Wu's speech is very long, which can be summarized as follows:
(1) Ketuan Zhan has been relieved of all duties. Also expelled from the original Huawei company HR Zhi Wang introduced by Ketuan Zhan at the end of 2018. Zhi Wang’s reputation on Bitmain was extremely poor and was ridiculed by employees as "nine thousand years" (In ancient China, the emperor was called "ten thousand years old", and the prince was "eight thousand years old." However, in the Ming Dynasty, there was an eunuch who caused harm to the country and the people. He called himself "nine thousand years old", meaning that he was only A little lower than the emperor's level).
(2) Ketuan Zhan's ability to control the company's option incentive plan has disappeared, and it is no longer possible to cancel employees' options at will.
(3) The organizational structure adjustment plan led by Ketuan Zhan was suspended.
(4) We are optimistic about the future of AI business, but the premise is that the main business can continue to make profits in order to support the company's continued investment in AI business.
In the speech, Jihan Wu also told employees the whole story of the "12.17 Incident" and bluntly said that the company is not in good condition. If no measures are taken, Bitmain is likely to go bankrupt in three quarters and he must come back to save the company.
At this time, Ketuan Zhan, who was on a business trip in Shenzhen, finally experienced the situation of Jihan Wu in the "12.17 Incident".
After the official return, Jihan Wu began to clearly point out the company's various problems in operation and management, and went deep into each business line to understand the situation. In the mining machine sales department meeting, employees spoke enthusiastically, reflecting on the difficulties and opinions encountered in the work, the marketing and sales director from Huawei asked with a surprised look, "Why didn't these issues be reported to me before?", and soon , The director was interviewed and "voluntarily resigned."
On November 2, 2019, Jihan Wu announced a salary increase for all employees. Bitmain’s last salary increase dates back to 2018. In principle, Bitmain has two salary increases every year.
On November 7, 2019, Ketuan Zhan spoke on social media for the first time, describing his hardship in starting a business, and condemning Jihan Wu for “stabbing a knife in the back”. At the end of the article, he also set himself a KPI for 2020, that is, the mining machine market share will reach 90%, and the AI ​​business will earn 1 billion.
But Ketuan Zhan's majestic plan did not make Bitmain employees feel emotional, but ridiculed him instead. Employees exposed that he insulted employees, advocated Chinese medicine, believed in Buddhism, drank in meetings, practiced Qigong...
However, there is less than half a year before the halving of Bitcoin production, and the cryptocurrency market shows no signs of recovery, which makes Bitmain management very anxious.
On January 6, 2020, Bitmain ushered in another round of layoffs, with a layoff ratio of about 1/3. This time the layoffs have caused many employees who have just increased their salaries to feel very grieved. On the one hand, they were looking forward to Jihan Wu's return. On the other hand, the compensation for this layoff was less than 18 years.
Ketuan Zhan, who has been unable to enter the Bitmain office area, once again spoke on social media and firmly opposed to layoffs. We do not need to lay off staff and we cannot commit suicide.
During the Spring Festival, Covid-19 broke out. Mainland China has begun to extend the Spring Festival holiday and advocate working from home. Under the chain reaction caused by Covid-19, most companies have chosen to cut salaries or even lay off employees. In the first two months of 2020, China's exports fell by 17%, U.S. stocks were broken four times in a row, Bitcoin plunged 40% in 24 hours on March 12, 2020, and crude oil futures fell by 300% on April 20, 2020...
Obviously, Jihan Wu can't predict, but this layoff seems to be the right decision again. In addition, from January to April 2020, Bitmain's revenue exceeded US$400 million amid the spread of Covid-19 and the collapse of the financial market.
6. Fight to the death
When Jihan Wu tried to get the company back on track, Ketuan Zhan was not helpless. On April 28, 2020, Ketuan Zhan finally rolled back the legal representative of Beijing Bitmain to before October 28, 2019 by repeatedly submitting administrative reconsiderations, and restored his status as a legal representative.
On the morning of May 8, 2020, a piece of news about Bitmain quickly appeared on the real-time hot search rankings, and even dominated the headlines of the day. At window 52 on the second floor of the Haidian District Government Affairs Center, when Ketuan Zhan, the legal person of Beijing Bitmain Company, was receiving the business license, a group of unidentified people snatched the business license from the industrial and commercial administrative staff. A source at the scene said that the number of unidentified people in the group was about 60 people, of which Luyao Liu was directing at the scene.
This is a skillful piece of news. It first leads readers to think that Ketuan Zhan is a victim, using 60 people to grab business licenses as the focus. The masses accused Jihan Wu of lawlessness, but ignored whether the government affairs center could have 60 personnel. As for Hong Kong Bitmain to have the right to appoint a representative to obtain a business license, this is a deeper level of thinking.
The follow-up report restored the real situation at the scene. Only more than ten people were present, and both sides were equipped with security personnel. Bitmain employees also broke the news in the circle of friends, claiming that Ketuan Zhan's bodyguard had injured Bitmain's authorized person, and said in a threatening tone, "Be careful!"
However, the subsequent plot reversal did not have much effect. Jihan Wu's reputation has been greatly affected. From a bloody soldier who rescued the company in trouble to a lawless criminal, it can be said to be a world of war. do not.
Ketuan Zhan, who succeeded in the first battle, began to counterattack Bitmain continuously. On the afternoon of June 3, 2020, Ketuan Zhan led a team to pry open the back door of the Beijing Bitmain office and formally occupied the deserted Beijing headquarters.
On June 4, 2020, Ketuan Zhan called on Bitmain employees to resume work and promised to expand the company's market value to more than US$50 billion within three to five years. After that, Ketuan Zhan began to contact employees by phone, trying to acquire the options in the hands of employees at a valuation of 4 billion US dollars.
Subsequently, Ketuan Zhan recalled Huawei's executives and issued a series of personnel appointments and removals. As of June 9, 2020, Ketuan Zhan has successively eliminated CFO Luyao Liu, and Wenguang Wang, the head of the mining center. Luyao Liu is responsible for controlling Bitmain's IPO plan. He also appointed Yanwu Ma as the HR director, Gang Ren as the head of the mining center, Yonggang Sun as the head of the supply chain, Ling Gu as the financial director, and Bin Zhu as the head of the mining machine business department. Bin Zhu is the senior executive of Huawei who was interviewed and left as mentioned in the previous article. During his tenure, he reduced Antminer’s 90% market share to 50%, and received a large number of complaints from miners. Internal employees once speculated that he might be Compete against the spies sent by the company.
In addition to recalling senior executives of Huawei, Ketuan Zhan also urged employees to return to work. They can receive a bonus of 10,000 yuan when they return to work on the same day, which is only half the next day. Ketuan Zhan showed a very kind side. Every time the elevator door is opened, Ketuan Zhan's hot gaze can be met, shaking hands, taking photos, and receiving money. As there is no personnel information, Ketuan Zhan does not know whether the person receiving the money is a Bitmain employee, and these people did not resume work the next day.
The effect of gentleness was not good, Ketuan Zhan began to force employees to return to work. Seeing that there are still very few respondents, Ketuan Zhan threatened employees through SMS, phone calls, EMS, emails and other harassment, issued multiple threats such as termination of contract, suspension of payment of social insurance, suspension of wages, and even used personal information saved by employees to form a group of employees. Domicile threats, requiring employees to perform "work handover", trying to force employees to return work computers, etc.
On June 10, 2020, the media revealed that Ketuan Zhan had controlled Bitmain's Shenzhen factory and prohibited employees from delivering normal shipments to paid customers, which caused difficulties in the operation of the Bitmain mining machine department.
On June 13, 2020, Hong Kong Bitmain, the parent company of Beijing Bitmain, issued a statement accusing Ketuan Zhan of signing a "Sales Agency Agreement" with the Ark Data Technology Co., Ltd. in which it holds shares, in an attempt to embezzle Beijing Bit's assets.
On June 17, 2020, the media revealed that Ketuan Zhan started selling 14,000 T17+ series mining machines at low prices.
On June 20, 2020, Hong Kong Bitmain officially suspended the supply of chips to the Shenzhen factory.
On July 13, 2020, in the "A Letter to All My colleagues in the Shenzhen Factory" released by Bitmain in Hong Kong, more details were added on the series of Ketuan Zhan's actions in June.
The legal person Feng Zhou of the Shenzhen plant is related to Ketuan Zhan. After being relieved of Ketuan Zhan's post, Jihan Wu flew to Shenzhen to have a long talk with Feng Zhou. Jihan Wu believes that Feng Zhou is the right person to manage the factory and help the company overcome difficulties, and decides to leave Feng Zhou to continue to manage the factory.
This wrong decision staged a story of a farmer and a snake. When Ketuan Zhan began to counterattack Bitmain, Feng Zhou was also quickly instigated and began to assist Ketuan Zhan in seizing customer machines and transferring 17,000 T17 mining machines in the warehouse. Hainan Continental Ark Data Technology Co., Ltd., which is held by Ketuan Zhan, sold them at a low price.
In order to protect the interests of customers, Jihan Wu had to make a compromise and paid the payment for some goods to a bank account controlled by Ketuan Zhan in exchange for delivery. However, after the other party received a payment of 109 million, the delivery stopped. On July 8, 2020, 5600 mining machines have been overdue.
At the same time, the factory defaulted on suppliers’ accounts payable as much as 200 million yuan. Bank acceptance bills issued by the factory, exceeding 36 million yuan, will expire on July 17, and more than 34 million yuan will expire on July 23. It is understood that Ketuan Zhan, after receiving the bank's dunning call, made it clear that he would not repay the loan, which would destroy the company and the entire group's credit in financial institutions.
7、 This is not the end
So far, the power struggle between the founders of Bitmain has been more than half a year. The office building already occupied by Ketuan Zhan is still empty, and most employees choose to work from home. Some chip developers returned to the office with the acquiescence of Jihan Wu and continued to maintain research and development to reduce the impact of infighting on technological iteration and competitiveness.
This giant ship that once stood on top of the supercomputer chip is crashing into the iceberg due to the madness of the former helm. Ketuan Zhan's madness and Jihan Wu's compromise made mistakes again and again. Bitmain tried to save himself many times, but was unable to get out of the black hole.
If the time goes back to that day in 2013, would Jihan Wu and Yuesheng Ge still choose to dial Ketuan Zhan?
submitted by paulcheung1990 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

[Discussion] AAS induced hypogonadism and an appeal to the community

Tldr; AAS induced hypogonadism is a very real consequence of steroid use, and the wiki needs to be updated to state this fact clearly and without bias so that prospective users who find TRT (for life) an unacceptable consequence can make an informed decision. Also, lots of people, and some are experienced users, have demonstrated that they don't believe this is a thing.

Before I begin, I want to qualify myself a bit as I am asking that we address something together and make a change to the wiki. I am a 30 year old who has been into weight lifting since I was 15, and I had a keen interest in AAS that led me to my first cycle at 24. I'm on TRT. I have a BS in biochemistry and although that is not inherently relevant, it did give me a tendency to research topics I was unfamiliar with, and to do so in peer-reviewed sources.
Over the last 10 years, AAS use has exploded in popularity. It amazes me sometimes when I show up at the gym and see clearly enhanced lifters all around. Bitcoin has made AAS accessible to anyone with a mailbox; for very low prices you can have any major steroid in the bodybuilding world shipped to you in a week or less, and you don't even need to go to the dark web to find it. You don't need to know a guy. This surge in new users has clearly diluted the atmosphere of online steroid forums, whose members used to be very scrutinizing and against anyone hopping on gear if they seemed even slightly uninformed of the ins and outs.
While I think its overall a good thing that the tone has become more welcoming, since people are going to do their thing regardless, I have noticed that we've collectively been skating over something that didn't used to happen as often. That thing is AAS-induced hypogonadism. In the past 4-5 months I cannot count the number of times I have informed a newcomer that recovery not only wasn't guaranteed, but multiple cycles and years of use make TRT a VERY real outcome. Now, I know there are many who recover from years of use, the majority. That is great. But there are no studies that I can find that show what percentage do and don't, or what parameters are involved. I only have the experience of my many friends, people on these kinds of forums, an endocrinologist, and myself to go on and I can say that there are a lot of us walking around who are on TRT because of our AAS use. Literature overwhelmingly supports this.
The wiki itself states that length of suppression, the types of drugs used, and individual response are factors in determining HPTA recovery. It states that failure to do a proper pct "will present a very high probability of long-term endocrine damage" without saying anything about the possibility of not recovering even after you do everything right, giving the false impression that a pct will get everyone back to normal. The individual response paragraph discerns between users who will recovery easily and those who will have "extreme difficulty recovering" but makes no concession anywhere that there is a third category: those who's test levels never fully return to baseline. The HPTA was never designed to be fully suppressed and brought back, there is no situation where exogenous hormones would ever exist in any time during our evolution. The pituitary sends a message to the balls to make more test when it dips a bit, and then tells them to stop when it reaches a max. Small changes. Dumping hormones into your body causes a hijacking of that entire system and crashes it. The pituitary goes silent, your balls stop producing test, stop making sperm, shrink. They literally atrophy from disuse and revert back to being as useless as they were before puberty. Recovery from that is not a given. After my 3rd cycle, my test values returned to normal but my balls felt a tad smaller, my libido a bit off. My 4th cycle's pct failed, as did the 3 other pcts I attempted over the next 1.5 years. HCG runs, pharma pcts of varying lengths, but no matter what 2-3 months after pct I would dip down. I had lost 40% of my natural production and at the 2 year mark with no improvement I decided to do TRT. For me, it wasnt that huge of a deal because I love this lifestyle and knew I wanted to continue to cycle. But there are guys out there who may find this outcome unacceptable and should really make this the number 1 consideration in whether they cycle or not.
I made this post because I have been met with skepticism many of the times I have pointed out the possibility of not recovering. Someone today called it a myth on the same comment thread that he was giving a new guy advice on. Another guy last month PMed me to let me know he was thankful I had brought it up in a comment thread where a guy was asking about the chances of not recovering and 4-5 people were encouraging him that doing a pct and enough time off would prevent that. I get it, we don't like to think about it. Everyone, when they started, worried a bit about their natural levels coming back since everyone was so adamant about checking via bloodwork, but we seem to have calmed that down by carrying on that a proper pct is King and will set things right. The truth is, there are many people on and off these forums with AAS-induced hypogonadism and I am concerned about the numbers who are happily cycling not knowing their next pct is going to fail. While there is no guarantee, a test cycle will most likely go fine. But when people get into the territory of their 3rd, 4th, 5th cycles, more powerful drugs, BnC, they are most likely not going to leave with the test levels they came in with. For many, it will be severe enough of a dip to warrant TRT, others will suffer minor sides and just go on with life, and some will probably struggle for year with it. I visited an endocrinologist recently because I want to stop self prescribing and he told me he deals with this all the time, that its very common.
I don't really know how changes get made to the wiki, but I propose that we make it a very large disclaimer at the top of the PCT section and in the 500mg test cycle section. Below are just a few sources I found over a very short time. I suggest you look further if you need more evidence. I am not a gatekeeper and never will be, but if we transmit any information to a prospective user about how to take these drugs safely it should come with this fact. Discuss.

Coward RM, Rajanahally S, Kovac JR, Smith RP, Pastuszak AW, Lipshultz LI. Anabolic steroid induced hypogonadism in young men. The Journal of urology. 2013;190(6):2200–5. Epub 2013/06/15. doi: 10.1016/j.juro.2013.06.010 pmid:23764075.

Rahnema CD, Lipshultz LI, Crosnoe LE, Kovac JR, Kim ED. Anabolic steroid-induced hypogonadism: diagnosis and treatment. Fertil Steril. 2014;101(5):1271–9. Epub 2014/03/19. doi: 10.1016/j.fertnstert.2014.02.002 pmid:24636400.

Tan RS, Scally MC. Anabolic steroid-induced hypogonadism—towards a unified hypothesis of anabolic steroid action. Med Hypotheses. 2009;72(6):723–8. Epub 2009/02/24. doi: 10.1016/j.mehy.2008.12.042 pmid:19231088.

van Breda E, Keizer HA, Kuipers H, Wolffenbuttel BH. Androgenic anabolic steroid use and severe hypothalamic-pituitary dysfunction: a case study. International journal of sports medicine. 2003;24(3):195–6. Epub 2003/05/13. doi: 10.1055/s-2003-39089 pmid:12740738.

Boregowda K, Joels L, Stephens JW, Price DE. Persistent primary hypogonadism associated with anabolic steroid abuse. Fertil Steril. 2011;96(1):e7–8. Epub 2011/05/18. doi: 10.1016/j.fertnstert.2011.04.029 pmid:21575947.

Jarow JP, Lipshultz LI. Anabolic steroid-induced hypogonadotropic hypogonadism. Am J Sports Med. 1990;18(4):429–31. Epub 1990/07/01. pmid:2403193.

Lloyd FH, Powell P, Murdoch AP. Anabolic steroid abuse by body builders and male subfertility. BMJ. 1996;313(7049):100–1. Epub 1996/07/13. pmid:8688713; PubMed Central PMCID: PMC2351471.

Kanayama G, Hudson JI, DeLuca J, Isaacs S, Baggish A, Weiner R, et al. Prolonged hypogonadism in males following withdrawal from anabolic-androgenic steroids: an under-recognized problem. Addiction. 2015;110(5):823–31. Epub 2015/01/20. doi: 10.1111/add.12850 pmid:25598171; PubMed Central PMCID: PMC4398624.

Kanayama G, Hudson JI, Pope HG Jr. Long term psychiatric and medical consequences of anabolic androgenic steroid abuse: a looming public health concern. Drug Alcohol Depend. 2008 Nov 1;98(1-2):1-12. doi: 10.1016/j.drugalcdep. 2008.05.004. Epub 2008 Jul 2. Review. PMID: 18599224
EDIT: does anyone know how we even go about modifying the wiki? What’s the process?
submitted by benchpressyourfeels to steroids [link] [comments]

Nano #Ama on Binance Spanish telegram group!!

Regards!! I'm Jesús Zambrano, member of the Hispanic community of NANO for a long time. Last thursday, we had an interesting and enjoying Ask-me-anything at Binance Spanish community on telegram with the people behind NANO, Colin LeMahieu (Founder and Executive Director) and Zach Hyatt (Proyect Manager), where we take advantage of their kindness and willingness to ask them some questions and share opinions about de currency. I will share a compilation of some of the questions and answers.
-(Admin) ¡Welcome Binancians to our following AMA!
I will explain how AMA works; we will have three (3) segments.
Segment #1: I am going to ask to our guests five (5) questions and then they will answer them.
I will be explaining the rest of the segments as we conclude one of them.
-(Admin) Today we have the great pleasure of having Colin (Founder and Executive Director) and Zach (Project Manager) with us in our chat room. Could you give us a little introduction about you?
- (Zach) Hi everyone, I am Zach Hyatt, the Project Manager at the Nano Foundation and am excited to help answer questions about Nano. I live in Austin, TX where it is quite hot right now!
-(Colin) I’m Colin LeMahieu, founder of Nano. I’m a computer engineer and I’ve worked at companies like Qualcomm, Dell, and AMD. I have been working on Nano for about 5 years now and I’m really excited to talk with people who are interested as well!
-(Admin) It is a pleasure for us to have you here, I have to say that on a personal level, I have been a follower of the project for a long time now, so it is incredible for me to be able to count on you tonight, we will start with segment # 1, with the questions I have for you.
Feeless transactions and in record time! What is NANO? Can you give us an introduction to the project?
-(Colin) Nano’s goal is to solve problems with other cryptocurrencies and make sending value fast and fee-less. It has a unique design to allow us to accomplish this. We want people to have the option of using decentralized digital money instead of fiat money anywhere in the world. Nano is accessible and easy-to-use today and we plan on keeping it focused on these goals.
-(Admin) Thank you for answering my first question, I am delighted with the features offered by the project, every week they are updating and making important changes that help to improve the ecosystem that surrounds the team.
Here you can find all the weekly updates: https://nano.org/en
Previously the project was called RaiBlocks, it appeared for the first time in an ad in Bitcoin Talk in 2015. Can you tell us why a name change came up later?
-(Zach) Yeah, absolutely. Although the original RaiBlocks name has a special place in our history, it was difficult to pronounce in some areas of the world and caused confusion with certain users. We decided to move to a shorter name that not only was easy to pronounce but also reflected the fast, efficient nature of the protocol.
-(Admin) A short and quick name to pronounce, definitely NANO is perfect to define it!
My third question is the following; I had seen a very interesting gif early in the chat and it is just about the question that I came to ask.
Currently, NANO has 100% of its tokens in circulation and these tokens were distributed through Faucets, so it meant that any user with a computer could get coins simply by completing some captchas, can you tell me which has been the experience of users when using this method?
-(Colin) The faucet was a great way for us to distribute coins to people who have never used it before. Cryptocurrencies that use mining end up distributing only to people who have money to buy the mining hardware and this is unfair. We had a lot of people from Indonesia and Asia in the beginning of our distribution and at the end there were a lot of people from South America, Venezuela and Brasil that were getting most of the Nano from the faucet. We think this was a fairer way to do it and it got Nano into the hands of people in different locations, and it had a very positive impact on their lives.
-(Admin) This is incredible! thanks for your answer!
Can you tell us about what the Open Representative Vote is about and how it protects the network?
-(Zach) Nano uses voting to get confirmation on the network instead of mining and the nodes on the network that create votes are called Representatives. Open Representative Voting allows people who have a Nano balance to pick whatever representative they want to vote on their behalf. This allows the people who hold Nano to decide who generates consensus instead of mining companies. The voting process is very efficient and is a big part of what allows Nano to be fee-less and use very little energy.
-(Admin) Very good! The last question on my part:
Nano PoW is your new approach, I have read a pretty interesting example with emails, can you explain what it is about?
-(Colin) Nano PoW is a research project we’re doing in order to create a proof of work algorithm that uses less energy than other popular algorithms. Since Nano is fee-less, there must be a method to limit transactions going onto the network, which this PoW achieves. With the goal of using more memory in the process instead of CPU cycles in order to generate proofs, this new Nano PoW will help prevent ASICs from being able to cheaply send lots of transactions. It’s important for a cryptocurrency that’s used around the world to be energy efficient and green so continuing our research on this is important to us.
-(Admin) https://medium.com/nanocurrency/nano-pow-the-details-ba22a9092d6f
Thanks for your answers, Colin and Zach! I have a video, taken from your YouTube account that I would like to share with the community
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eh9pA8UCUrI
Can you tell me what we see in this video?
-(Colin) This is a video of how fast our transactions send and receive. You can see it takes less than 1 second to finish which means you can use it as a currency.
- (Zach) The wallet was made by developers in our amazing community, it is called Natrium. It really shows how fast Nano is and how it is easy-to-use!
-(Colin) You can also see how simple it is to use. You just scan, enter an amount, and send. There are no complicated setting which is great for new users and great for adoption.
- (Zach) And the best part is, there were no fees at all for that transaction. In fact there have never been any transaction fees on the Nano network ever!
-(Admin) Great! That's why I wanted to share it with everyone, yesterday I could try the wallet and it is really spectacular to use, thank you very much for that excellent explanation, please stay with us, now comes the part in which our users participate
Segment 3, community questions
Q -First congratulations on your project, it is amazing. Now, does nano BlockChain have another use besides making transactions?
A - (Zach) Thank you! Nano has always been focused on transfer of value and will continue to maintain that focus. The overall design is aimed at doing only this so it can remain fast, efficient and fee-less.
Q -Good evening! I understand that thanks to its architecture called "Block-lattice", each individual provides the computing power necessary to verify their own transaction, thanks to this they do not use miners to confirm transactions and they do not apply commissions of any kind. My question is: How did this occur and how difficult was it?
A - (Colin) It’s simila, transactions are validated by votes from the representatives, not by the PoW. The PoW is a way to slow down how fast people can create transactions so they can’t spam the network.
Q - Do you have any short or long term projects so that transactions using $NANO were anonymous?
A - (Colin) Long term we want to see what privacy options exist and are fast. Most privacy schemes make the transactions very big or slow to process and it’s important for things to remain quick and efficient so we can have fast transactions.
Q - We are living in Venezuela many changes in the cryptocurrency sector, the integration of crypto for service payment and product purchases is already a reality. What agreements has NANO made with service stores to integrate it as a means of payment? I want to pay my movie ticket with NANOS
A - (Zach) Thanks for your interest in Nano. We are always looking for ways to allow everyone to use Nano in as many places as possible. Although separate from our organization, we are aware of the efforts of the Nano Venezuela organization and try to support them when possible in bringing Nano to as many people and stores in Venezuela as possible.
Q - (7 questions made from one persone at once)
  1. How do you manage to make your transactions virtually instantaneous?
  2. How do they create part of the company's livelihood if no fees are charged for transactions?
  3. Why does $ NANO consume so little electricity?
  4. Requirements for a medium-sized company to adopt nano correctly as a means of payment?
  5. Since 100% of the $ NANOS are distributed, I have seen something in Medium that talked about `` Nano PoW '', could you tell me a little more about how it works? What profit will the person / institution get that puts hardware for their PoW? Will more $ NANO be created apart from those already in circulation?
  6. What do the representatives earn for putting their vote and validating blocks if 100% of the $ NANOS are already created / issued?
7- Since your policy / slogan / commandment is to be a cryptocurrency without fees, shouldn't you force exchanges in which $ NANO is present that they don't charge withdrawal fees?
A - (Colin)
  1. Transactions are fast because they’re validated by voting. The votes get transmitted around the world in milliseconds and all people have to do is count votes to confirm the transaction.
  2. We use the Dev fund to pay for developing the Nano protocol. The Nano protocol is a free tool that other people can build businesses on. We have ideas for businesses that can use fast, free money in order to help people send money to their family in other countries or pay microtransactions. It’s similar to Linux, it’s free but big companies use it because it saves them money.
  3. Nano uses little electricity because we use voting for validating transactions. Voting is just sending data over the internet which is power efficient.
  4. You can run a nano node with 40-60$/mo using cloud virtual machines
  5. Nano pow is just a more efficient way to slow people down from sending transactions to the network
  6. The most important thing is: why does a company want to use cryptocurrency? They want to use it because it saves them money on bank fees, etc. Since 40-60$/mo running a node is less expensive than their bank fees, they want to participate in the network to keep it going and save them money.
Q - Knowing all this about Nano, could you say that Nano is one of the most energy-efficient, Ecological friendly currencies in existence?
A -(Zach) Absolutely. We care about making a positive change in the world and so pride ourselves on leaving as little energy trace possible in the world. It may just be the fastest, most efficient transfer of value available.
Q - If the nano protocol had not passed the Red4Sec signature security test, would it have any vulnerability today?
A - (Colin) The Red4Sec audit didn’t find any critiral vulnerabilities in Nano. In fact they did the audit twice because they couldn’t find anything wrong and that never happened before.
It’s important for us to keep the code high quality and we will do audits again in the future because it’s important to make sure everything is secure.
Q - I'd like to see more development of Nano by using SMS on our phones to avoid the problem of no Internet connection at the moment
A -(Zach) As much as we like the idea of SMS, unfortunately it is not a secure network so managing Nano transactions over it brings some unique requirements. However we are always innovating and trying to make Nano as easy and accessible as possible so hope advances can help over time make it more accessible in this area.
Q - What plans do you have to close this 2019 to increase adoption in Latin America?
A -(Colin) We are very excited about the passion we see in the south american community. We would love to make it down to VE however in the mean time follow nanoVE for updates and meetups - there may be one near you soon!
Q - How will you make the adoption and use of $ NANO continue to increase especially in markets where other cryptocurrencies are gaining more ground?
A - (Colin) Our focus is to build tools people need to accept cryptocurrency. Right now it’s still difficulty and expensive. One thing we’re making is the device Appia which can accept cryptocurrency similar to a credit card. We made this device very inexpensive and can connect over wireless so it can be used in markets or resturaunts or other places cryptocurrency is not yet available.
- (Admin) Thank you very much for your answers! You are the first guests that answer all the questions of our users, you are amazing guys!
@AndyNano It was amazing to meet you, I learned a lot from you
@FundacionNanoVE Thanks for making this happen! excellent work
@nano_isam Thanks for everything buddy!
-(Zach) Can we ask a question to the channel?
What are the top things Nano can do to help you in your daily lives?
-(Colin) My question: How do you store cryptocurrency safely? Where do you back up your seed so it isn’t lost or stolen?
A - In Venezuela we currently have a problem with conventional payment processors, they are very slow, it would be great to be able to see people using NANO to make their purchases at any store in Venezuela, 0 commissions and instant transactions, is what we need
A - Fast transactions are what can help society the most, and except that, the best thing is that it is very cheap ... from there it is addition, those are the main characteristics that we look for the most
A - encrypted file in a pendrive
A - Nano is a direct competition to the vast majority of Cryptos, in transaction speed and that it is literally free to send or receive, nothing to wait for 5 hours or the next day when you pay for items or services with Crypto, let's increase the adoption of nano!
-(Colin) Question: Are there barriers to using Nano in your country right now?
A - No barriers in Venezuela
A - No barrier what is lacking is greater diffusion in means to give greater projection and that the adoption arrives. Here I am to support NANO!
A - There should be no barriers to the payments we wish to make, freedom above all
-(Colin) Fantastic!
- (Zach) Thanks everyone, I have to go but I appreciate all the awesome questions and answers!
submitted by AlejandroZD58 to nanocurrency [link] [comments]

Thoughts on the current downturn

From https://forums.prohashing.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&p=23082#p23082:
---------------------------------------------

The current downturn in the cryptocurrency markets itself isn't very surprising. There have been many bubbles before, and there will be at least one more bubble after this. What surprises me about this cycle is how quickly the market has collapsed. Whereas previous cycles fell slowly after the long middle period where prices stalled, this time the bottom fell out in the course of a week. This post will review the consequences of the new market reality.

Bitcoins are holding up well
Perhaps the biggest shock of this cycle is how the price of bitcoins has held up so well compared to that of other coins. In June 2017, when we were deciding whether this pool could be a profitable business and how many people we should hire if it could be. We determined that the average case where the coins would settle was bitcoins at $1574, ETH at $110, and LTC at $30. ETH and LTC have already surpassed the average case decline we had projected, while BTC is holding above twice the projected bottom.

The reason for BTC holding up so well isn't obvious. Almost every other coin is superior to BTC in some way. For example, LTC and BCH are much cheaper to send money with, ETH is used for contracts, and Monero has anonymity.

I don't think that bitcoins will hold up for much longer. I think that the capitulation to $980 is still ahead, and the price after capitulation will be $1500 or so. The BTC network still hasn't reckoned with the lack of a realistic plan to increase its block size. At some point, the lightning network is going to be shown as a technical marvel that works well when people are running nodes, but that it's too difficult for ordinary users and that money transmission regulations will not permit most businesses to run nodes. The Core developers are still pressing on with their effort despite the money transmission regulations.

Right now, growth is being driven by people willing to experiment. Eventually, the lightning network will run out of hobbyists to adopt it and its growth will cease, because normal businesses like us won't touch it due to the legal risks. At that point, people will realize that there is no "Plan B" for Bitcoin, and perhaps that will cause capitulation and force the Core to reevaluate their path forward.


We should reevaluate how coins are valued
Another change in this crash from the previous crashes is the complete lack of news to explain it. During the $32 -> $2 downturn, it was quite possible that nobody would ever adopt cryptocurrencies. During the $266 -> $69 downturn, many believed that Mt. Gox's unreliability and instability would lead to the death of the industry. During the $1160 -> $160 bubble, China banned bitcoins every week. But during the past two weeks, there has been no news of any importance.

In particular, ETH prices are absurd. I really don't understand how people think that ETH is priced anything close to its real value. Gas prices continue to rise and people think it's worth 6% of what it was a year ago? If I were paid in dollars, I would be changing them to ETH as fast as I could right now.

Since these prices don't make sense with what many people and I think are the fundamentals, then we need to reevaluate our views on how coins are valued. It's quite possible that the idea that things like transaction capacity and features [i]don't actually matter[/i].

There was one news article that caught my attention a while back. It proposed that, during 2017, a lot of the buyers into coins came from "ordinary people" who knew very little about cryptocurrencies. These people talked about coins at parties and bought what their friends bought. Someone like me, who spends most of his time at home writing code for this business, who is not married, and who has fewer friends than the average person, would not have been exposed to enough instances to make a connection if it were true that someone talked about bitcoins at every social event. I'd also venture that many of the people discussing bubbles in Internet forums also engage in less socializing than the average person, so reading theories about what happened from them leads to inaccurate conclusions.

During the next bubble, I'm going to more strongly consider social issues rather than technical issues and see whether that increases the accuracy of my predictions.


IPOs of mining manufacturers were too slow
One way to predict that this would not be a quick recovery into another bubble like the first 2013 collapse was to look at the IPOs from the mining manufacturers. Businesses don't issue IPOs when they have plenty of money - why would you give up potential profits to get money now if you don't need it? Instead, executives at the companies were really smart and saw that the writing was on the wall. Their problem was that they moved too slowly to sell their stakes. I don't think that the IPOs will be able to raise sufficient capital at this point and they will probably be cancelled. Bitmain or one of the other big mining manufacturers will likely go out of business.

Mining manufacturing is an interesting business because there is zero demand for your product during times like these. The industry basically resets every few years with new companies. The bitcoin difficulty just fell 15% during the last period, and the market is flooded with the miners that were just shut down. Why would anyone buy a new miner when all these old miners are being given away at any cost?

It doesn't make sense that anyone would ever invest in these IPOs or in the rumored Coinbase IPO. All of these stocks are 100% dependent on the cryptocurrency market recovering. If cryptocurrencies settle at these prices indefinitely, Coinbase will be unable to support its operations and will collapse, so you'll lose a lot more money than if you invested in coins (which have no chance of ever being completely worthless anymore.) If cryptocurrencies increase in value, they will go up by 100-1000x and Coinbase's stock will go up by 5x or 10x. In both cases, buying an IPO in the cryptocurrency world never makes as much sense as buying the coins themselves. Either buy coins or buy stocks in some unrelated industry to diversify.


"Manipulation" is a buzzword people use to explain things they don't like
Whenever prices fall, people start complaining about "manipulation." They experienced a huge drop, so the people selling must have been "manipulating" the market to cause them to lose money. The latest theory is that Bitfinex is not being honest with its Tether reserves. Bitfinex clearly violated the law by serving US customers and not shutting down when it was insolvent, but there isn't any evidence that Tether is going to fail due to fraud.

Note that Tether may fail due to banks discontinuing Tether's accounts, but that is different than fraud where a misrepresentation is being made.

I don't believe that the cryptocurrency markets are "manipulated" like most people think. There are some scams, especially those where people create ICOs and don't deliver a product. I doubt that the SEC will bring any charges against Bitfinex, and most of these complaints about "manipulation" are simply people complaining because they lost money.


Businesses will start to fail
Now I can get to the consequence that I think is the most important to understand in predicting how the next cycle plays out.

One of the reasons that the next bubble is a while away is because there have not yet been a lot of businesses that have failed. One of the unfortunate aspects of cryptocurrency, and one that significantly delays its development, is how the bubble cycle causes good ideas to fail. For example, the ETCDEV team, which contributed to Ethereum Classic development, recently folded due to bankruptcy. While I don't hold much love for people who are willing to overlook something as heinous as the DAO theft, the ETCDEV team did seem like it would be a significant contributor to developing ETC, and that won't happen now.

In fact, it's more likely that honest, ethical businesses will fail during this coming down cycle than scammers and fraudsters. It doesn't cost much to be a scammer - you just register some fake accounts and announce a new project, then disappear with all the money. Operating an honest business is expensive. It will cost us $15,000 just to comply with the 1099-MISC regulations next month. That's why, as prices fall, we should expect disreputable people to start to again outnumber law-abiding citizens in this industry. We can already see that happening as people with criminal records like Craig Wright, Roger Ver, and Charlie Shrem are dominating the conversation more and more.

As prices fall, businesses will need to make a decision. Many of them will decide to "pivot" - which essentially means that the company is shutting down and is creating a new firm in a different industry. This was common in 2015. Remember that the level at which a company should quit working in cryptocurrencies is not determined by whether they are making money, but by whether they are making as much money as they could in another field. Most of the time, companies that "pivot" don't return to whatever they were doing before, because they either find the "pivot" field to be lucrative, in which case it makes sense to keep at it, or they go bankrupt in that field too and close down permanently.

They key issue with these "pivots" and outright bankruptcies is that talent leaves the industry and is permanently gone. It takes at least 6 months for a programmer to join a project and become familiar with a codebase, during which time that person's productivity is significantly reduced. The cost of training a new hire is often as much as that person's salary for an entire year, given that other people in the company need to slow down to train the new person. When people leave a company, they don't just come back if times get better. They get new jobs, with new responsibilities, and that knowledge is lost.

Suppose that there is a company that has created an amazing Ethereum-based marketplace that will eventually gain millions of simultaneous customers. The marketplace reaches completion, but in the downturn the company is forced to shut down until the market turns around again, because all their customers are gone. Even if the owner of the company retains the software and is available and willing to restart when the next bubble begins, years have passed and new employees are needed. It will take 6 months to get all the employees hired, another 3 to get them minimally trained, another 1 to upgrade all the development environments, packages, and tools that became obsolete during the stoppage to get everything up to current standards, and another 2 to redo the website design to do the same thing with different colors and designs because the Internet for some reason changed its mind on what makes "attractive" webpages again.

If the downturn lasts two years, then this project could have been out [i]three years earlier[/i] if it weren't for the bubbles. Not only that, but the project's suspension itself contributed to the long duration of the bubble cycle. There would have been more activity in cryptocurrencies if this system had been available.

This effect is why I believe that as prices decline, the length of the upcoming downturn will increase significantly. Over the next weeks and months, we're going to start to hear of promising projects fail, and that's going to reduce the value of coins, cascading into other projects' feasibility, and creating a ripple effect of "pivots" and bankruptcies.

This is why I think that the first 2013 bubble had a much different outcome than the second 2013 bubble. In the first 2013 bubble, prices never collapsed after the long period of stability, and businesses were able to keep moving forward during that time. During the second 2013 bubble, prices collapsed after that period of stability that ended in August 2014, and one can look back at news articles form the day listing failures and "pivots" that occurred in the subsequent months.

If it weren't for bubbles, the industry would be years ahead of where it is now. The smartphone, for example, rose from unknown to market saturation in 10 years. After 10 years, where are cryptocurrencies, which also arose in 2008? About 6 or 7 years behind where they could be, because every bubble requires a reset with new companies, given that most of the work from the previous bubble is wasted.


There will be a next bubble
Finally, there will definitely be a next bubble - of that, I'm 100% certain. If you're not sure of that, then consider a scenario where you live in a world that already uses cryptocurrencies for all transactions. One day, a government decides that it's going to create its own currency, which it will be able to inflate at will, and which will take hundreds of times longer to conduct transactions with.

Do you think people would use that currency?
submitted by MattAbrams to BitcoinMarkets [link] [comments]

Overview of Major Risks of Buying Nyancoins - Version 6

This is the sixth version of the NYAN risks document (based on v5 (v4 (v3 , v2 and original)). These are obsoleted periodically as the old ones get archived to allow for comments again via a new post, to re-examine the risks in light of changes, and for greater visibility.
The purpose of these documents is to provide a best-effort discussion of major risk factors in gambling on NYAN, modeled on the risks disclosure in a 10k (annual report) which is mandated for publicly traded companies in the United States. This document is provided with no guarantee that major risk factors have not been missed, and it is important to recognize my (coinaday) personal bias from holding about one-third of the total supply of NYAN.
Please comment on any risks which are not mentioned here or additional aspects of risks here you think should be further emphasized or any other possible disclosure you think would be helpful to a person considering gambling on NYAN.
Executive summary
Nyancoins have no exchange, no core developer at the moment, uncertain demand, have had inconsistent blocks, are very vulnerable to 51% attacks, have the potential for serious bugs, an uncertain legal situation, concentrated ownership, low liquidity, depend upon the Internet, may be addictive, and could make you wealthy, which has been alleged to lead to more problems.
Introduction: This is my best attempt to collect every major risk factor from buying Nyancoins, although I can offer no warranty of fitness for this information for any purposes. I believe in honesty and forthrightness. Having this available and obvious is a simple matter of basic decency. Much, hopefully all, of this information has been discussed previously in /nyancoins, but this document in particular is about being up-to-date and central. This page will be updated clearly as appropriate if situations change on a best-effort basis (which may mean updates do not happen for months at times, unfortunately; please ping for faster updates).
If you believe that I am missing something, please note any other major risks you see in the comments.
Exchanges:
Nyancoins are not currently traded on any exchange. It may be listed on one minor exchange but have no volume there. Obviously an unlisted cryptocurrency is in a bad situation. I hope to see us gain a listing on an exchange which supports low volume coins in 2020 but I have no current prospect of this and it should be considered a longshot at best.
Previously we traded on Trade Satoshi and prior to that on Cryptopia and prior to that on Cryptsy. All three exchanges failed us (Trade Satoshi delisted without allowing withdrawal; Cryptopia delisted and failed to provide withdrawal and then went bankrupt; Cryptsy went bankrupt). This is a further reminder that exchanges are a major risk and one should be extremely careful to not keep more coins on there than one can comfortably afford to lose.
In theory, there are decentralized exchange technologies, notably CATE; however, I think we currently lack some needed APIs for this. I'm not certain but we haven't demonstrated the capability yet. On-Reddit exchanges are also possible with tipbots, but require trust as they are not atomic. It should be possible to build an "exchangebot" similarly, although I'm not currently aware of one, but my concept would still have the bot as a trusted central party.
Atomic cross-chain transactions seem to me like a very promising core technology ultimately for building exchanges which can be more proveably secure. They could also allow exchanges to share a common listing protocol as well without having to trust the other exchanges (at least, beyond the core protocol development and maintenance; tanstaafl). This is not yet accomplished though and in the meantime we remain vulnerable to periodic exchange failures.
Core developer: Although we have good general tech support in this community and have put up supporting infrastructure, there is not anyone officially currently working on core client code. This is a significant problem for the long-term, although we are not in any immediate known need of changes.
ImASharkRawwwr has returned to the community and may do future client updates, but I'm leaving the lack of core developer risk unchanged until there is an update released. This is not intended as a slight in any way but merely being cautious in the risks document and recognizing that we aren't certain when or if there will be a next release.
Demand: NYAN was introduced in 2014 and during the second half of that year had so little demand that it almost died out. In January 2015 I got involved in the coin and for most of 2015 and 2016 I was the majority of the buying pressure. I base these statements on my recollection of the trading history so far and the fact that I have acquired more than 120 million coins, somewhere around 41% of the coins (latest hodling report, June 2017), as well as my observations that I had usually had the leading major bid, and usually the leading bid regardless of size.
In 2017, I have generally not been a major factor in the demand, as I haven’t had money to spare to gamble on NYAN. In June 2017, we have had a spike in buying from an unknown source.
It is unknown whether significant demand for NYAN will continue. Because its value is purely speculative, it is entirely possible that demand for NYAN could simply end. This is a fundamental risk in gambling on NYAN; it is entirely possible that its value will go to zero and not recover.
By the end of 2019, we lost exchange listing. I know of no current demand for NYAN. I hope to see us listed and demand exist in the future but should not be relied upon. NYAN last traded around 9 satoshi according to coinmarketcap but it may well not even trade that high even if relisted someday - there could be a flood of selling and no buyers.
Inconsistent blocks:
Although NYAN is designed to produce a block every minute, there have been times where there has been more than 24 hours between blocks. This results because of an imperfect difficulty function and low base hashing, along with price fluctuations, which can combine to have a low difficulty making the coin attractive for a flood of hashing power which can lead the difficulty function to overcompensate, leaving it stuck with a high difficulty no longer profitable to mine.
I haven’t observed this lately, that is, I don’t recall incidents of this in 2017, but I’ve been paying far less attention to it as well. It is entirely possible for this to recur, as the difficulty function is not fixed (it would require a hard fork to fix it). We seem to have more baseline hashing which helps to avoid this, but it is possible for us to lose that.
A workaround is to use large transaction fees (I've set my client to 337 NYAN) which is enough to cause pools to generally solve a block even if the chain were otherwise stuck. It may be possible to include a better difficulty function in a hard fork client, but it is unknown when if ever this would be done and it's not yet clear what design improvement if any would fix this.
51% attack: Because of the generally quite low hashing power on NYAN, it is highly vulnerable to a 51% attack. Either a leading pool or a new one could choose to do a denial-of-service attack, whether for extortion, lulz, or some other reason (like coinaday being annoying). Such an attack is capable of preventing any transaction processing for as long as it is sustained. I consider this a relatively low risk since I expect we would simply wait it out (and potentially not even notice such an attack for quite a while given the low volume of transactions currently), but it is definitely a potential vulnerability.
Bugs: It is possible that there are bugs in the underlying code. I have never read through all of the bitcoin or nyancoin code, of any version, nor even studied the original bitcoin whitepaper in depth (by the way, we oughta make up a nyancoin whitepaper or ten someday), meaning I have no professional or technical knowledge about whether or not the system is fundamentally sound. I've been going based on "it seems to be working, so it's probably fine", which is, shall we say, more of an engineering than scientific approach.
I have heard reference to a "time warp" bug vulnerability in the KGW difficulty function which Nyancoins has. I do not know details and my understanding is a fix to this would require a fork to change the difficulty function, so I do not anticipate a fix before NYAN3, the term for an eventual hard fork, but it is unknown when if ever this would be done. I consider this vulnerability to be likely to be related to the fundamental weakness to difficulty spikes after large amounts of hashing jumps on the network. Hostile (or simply passing interest with large capacity) hashing does degrade the performance of the network. As a workaround, this class of attack can be mitigated with a transaction to 'unstick' the chain after, since the difficulty function will adjust in the next block after enough wall-time has passed since the last block (so only need one high difficulty solve which can be triggered by a transaction fee).
Legal: Bitcoin faces uncertain legal situations in almost every country. Nyancoin is even more uncertain, as people tend to consider bitcoin and not address impacts on altcoins. Between the potential tax implications and banking regulations and currency laws, there are a wide variety of ways a person could make a felony-level mistake. This can be somewhat mitigated by merely buying and holding, as you won't be responsible for KYC/AML presumably (although an argument could be made in your purchase), and presumably unrealized capital gains wouldn't be taxable (but I am neither a lawyer nor accountant nor any sort of expert on the relevant accounting laws in any country).
Somehow getting legal opinions for Nyancoins in every country would be very useful in my opinion. If Bitcoin and altcoins are well-studied in a given country it should be relatively easy to adapt those opinions and research to Nyancoins, but it would still require some pro bono work in any case. So...hopefully we'll get some lawyer Nekonauts someday who are willing to semi-officially give us an opinion. In the meantime...hope that common sense can save you. If you sell Nyancoins directly, you're going to need to comply with the KYC/AML types of laws of your country. If you're going to do banking operations...may the central bank have mercy on your soul.
I think the best advantage we have is the same bitcoin had for its first years: we're too small for anyone to care. But since we plan to grow significantly, we need to be aware of our legal issues upon scale. Which is to say, whether or not you're allowed to sell 10,000 NYAN to your friend probably has a lot to do with whether your friend legally acquired whatever is being offered in exchange, and whether the value of what you get in return is above a certain level or not. I'm not going to try guessing that level precisely because I know I'll be wrong. $1 is probably fine. $10,000 is probably illegal without some significant licensing. I would suggest either not touching fiat or else deliberately capping it without verification after getting an independent local expert legal opinion.
concentration: The fact that I hold about 41%(? not sure the exact percentage as of Dec 2017 ; need to do updated survey to check; 41% sounds slightly high to me but I'll see...I'll try to update by the end of the year or shortly after) of the currently outstanding NYAN could be a major risk factor, particularly if I do not act in the best long-term interests of the strength of Nyancoins. For instance, I could pull my bids, sell only a small part of my holdings, crash the market, and potentially buy a lot of volume for a lower price. While I cannot foresee any circumstance under which I would do this, it is certainly conceivable that I could be financially, legally, or morally obligated to do so if I were to become insolvent.
Liquidity: There is very little trading activity in NYAN. Therefore, large purchases will drive the price up and large sales will drive the price down. This means that entering and exiting a position is likely to result in "slippage", so even if the price has increased slightly overall since the time before one entered a position to the time before one exits it, it is quite possible that the overall trade will be neutral or negative as a result of the pressure on the market. For an extreme example, my own position would be essentially impossible to exit from the market without crashing the price, and even so it would likely be difficult to find buyers even at a satoshi, based on that I currently am the majority of the bids on the market. This is closely tied to the concentration risk but if I were to exit NYAN for any reason or simply fail to continue to renew bids the liquidity would dry up even further.
At the end of 2019, having no exchange, there is functionally zero liquidity. In theory peer to peer trading could still be done but I’m unaware of any.
Internet outage: if the Internet goes down, we hit a very nasty scenario. We can't process transactions, and all the miners go into a race to make 'useless' blocks on their own. If the Internet were never to come back up, Nyancoins would be dead. If there is a daylong internet outage, the longest blockchain discovered after, presumably representing the most hashing power dedicated to empty blocks during that outage, will win. So I suppose the block rewards in that case are for having the faith in Nyancoins to keep hashing and storing the blockchain during the day without the Internet.
addictive: This was a curiosity to me when I started. Now it's an obsession for me. I'm constantly thinking about how I can help to smooth the path for Nyancoins to grow stronger and better and more valuable. You may find that once you start to realize the impact you can have upon Nyancoins, and that Nyancoins can have upon you, that you start to become addicted as well. It is possible to substitute another addiction in its place, such as dogecoins or pcp, but it is not recommended.
Nyancoin addictions are considered 'mostly harmless'. The exception is if you go 'full coinaday' and start to accumulate more than 10% of your assets in Nyancoins. In this, this is essentially a variety of gambling addiction. I would argue that it beats roulette because you can tilt the odds in your favor, but then, I would argue that, wouldn't I?
mo' nyan mo' problems: Some people have claimed that more money leads to more problems. Since nyan is money, it follows as a consequence of the conjecture. Should this be the case, your increasing nyan could potentially lead to such problems in the future as: enhanced attention from revenue collection services of all kinds (governmental and private), swarms of fake friends and gold-diggers, excessive risk-taking as a result of feelings of invincibility, an increase in certain varieties of targeted marketing, possible disqualification for asset-based welfare for you (or even your children, for instance college financial assistance), an inability to remember how many houses you own, or other serious problems.
Conclusion
The lack of any exchange trading Nyancoins is a major risk factor in its future survival. If it is listed, the lack of development is likely the next most serious. The coin currently survives but whether it will continue to do so in the future is far from certain. If those of us who have found or come back to NYAN choose to keep it alive, I believe it still has a chance at surviving into a stronger future.
This self-certified infallible message has been brought to you as a Public Service Announcement of the NYAN Public Relations Council, a transparent front organization of notoriously lovable philanthropist and major NYAN hodler coinaday.
submitted by coinaday to nyancoins [link] [comments]

In response to ProofOfResearch's misleading article on NEO.

In response to ProofOfResearch's misleading article on NEO.
Yesterday, I was made aware of an article published by ProofOfResearch almost entirely based on a Reddit post that I had written a few months ago. About a month ago I was contacted by Randomshortdude (supposedly ProofOfResearch himself) asking for a permission to use the excerpts from the aforementioned post in his write-up about NEO. As an avid proponent of inclusivity and transparency, I gave a permission to use the contents of my post (the screenshots of the entire conversation will be added below), providing him with links to the Github repos and updating him on the fixes and improvements that have happened since the post had been published. Unknowingly, I continued to work on my projects while my post was being molded into a foundation for an entirely misleading and unfathomably unscientific article.
This post is going to consist of a list of excerpts from the article and the corresponding refutal for each of the listed excerpts.
"This is a semantic issue (example: $BTC having a 1 MB block size + 10 min block time limits TPS; no way around that) meaning that this is immutable"
Bitcoin doesn't have a 10 minute block time limit coded into the platform. The 10 minute average block production time is obtained via a difficulty adjustment formula that readjusts the difficulty of the underlying HashCash PoW algorithm every 2015 blocks (not 2016 due to a bug that was never fixed) based on the average block production time of the previous 2015 blocks.
"I’m not sure it’s even possible to change the digital signature of a protocol without a major hard fork, and there isn’t an alternative digital signature (that I think of), that would make this any more secure."
This excerpt is written in a reference to Point 2 of my Reddit post that criticizes the use of multisigs as a proof of the fact that a quorum (at least 2f + 1) replicas had signed the block hash. The use of multisig instead of signature batching via Schnorr's signatures doesn't affect the security of the nodes or the cryptographic standards used, however, the security of the network as a whole can be compromised due to the decreased number of full/light nodes operating increasing the likelihood of a spam attack being able to degrade the performance of the platform. Apart from that, a digital signature algorithm of the platform can be easily changed by adjusting the versioning of the block and transaction structures.
"Therefore, the consensus algo itself would need to be changed to amend this issue."
The consensus protocol works independently from the cryptographic standards of the platform, so a switch to a different elliptic curve or digital signature algorithm will have zero impact on the consensus algorithm.
"This, in itself, might be what stops $NEO from ever being able to truly scale."
While digital signature algorithms can vary in signing and verification speeds, the difference in the performance of the most popular signature schemes is small enough (except for BLS) to be considered to have a negligible impact on the efficiency of the consensus. As long the nodes are running on an efficient implementation, average network throughput is going continue to be the main bottleneck of the platform.
"Digital signatures are somewhat complex, but not incomprehensible if you really take the time to sit down and understand it. Once again though, it’s going to rely on an understanding of blockchain tech as well to know how this impacts the signing feature of a TX itself as well as pub key creation"
Digital signature algorithms play no role in public key creation as a public key is created simply by multiplying a 256-bit entropy (private key) by a generator (G).


A screenshot of a tweet used in the article.
Baffling. ed25519 DSA does not impact the efficiency of BFT and "blockchain" (whatever the hell that means in this context) as a result. Please also note that NEO does not use ed25519. NEO uses secp256r1 (as opposed to secp256k1 used by Bitcoin, which is a Koblitz curve) which is a NIST-recommended elliptic curve.
"Regular PoW algos are already designed to be Byzantine fault-tolerant already"
While being technically correct, the author dismisses the fact that BFT algorithms offer Byzantine fault-tolerance under rigid mathematical assumptions, in contrast to PoW algorithms which offer Byzantine fault-tolerance under probabilistic assumptions.
"Byzantine Fault Tolerance is not an issue though. It’s actually really useful but for private blockchains."
A common misconception about the use of BFT algorithms in "public" (the author meant permissioned/permission-less) blockchains. BFT algorithms are only required to retain the permissioned status during the agreement phase (meaning that the new candidates will have to wait until the next consensus round to be able to participate in the consensus) and can have a round robin algorithm implemented to select the next pool of validators.
"Of course, in a decentralized protocol — something like that is very hard to achieve."
The research paper quoted in the article examines the efficiency of Castro and Liskov's PBFT (Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance) algorithm which is dissimilar from dBFT because PBFT doesn't require a primary change after every consensus round, which is impacts the performance in a decentralized network.
“At the other extreme, Hyperledger uses the classic PBFT protocol, which is communication bound: O(N²) where N is the number of nodes. PBFT can tolerate fewer than N/3 failures, and works in three phases in which nodes broadcast messages to each other. First, the pre-prepare phase selects a leader which chooses a value to commit. Next, the prepare phase broadcasts the value to be validated. Finally, the commit phase waits for more than two third of the nodes to confirm before announcing that the value is committed. PBFT has been shown to achieve liveness and safety properties in a partially asynchronous model [11], thus, unlike PoW, once the block is appended it is confirmed immediately. It can tolerate more failures than PoW (which is vulnerable to 25% attacks [26]). However, PBFT assumes that node identities are known, therefore it can only work in the permissioned settings. Additionally, the protocol is unlikely to be able to scale to the network size of Ethereum beacuse of its communication overhead.”
This statement will require a separate post to examine the real-world "permission-lessness" of PoW chains.
"NEO codebase is virtually abandoned."
neo-sharp? neo-go?
"This is purportedly in favor of $NEO 3.0, but there’s no GitHub for $NEO 3.0 (at least not any that I’ve found)"
https://github.com/neo-project/neo/pull/288.
"The idea of it being able to handle 1000 TPS has been thoroughly debunked and it is virtually impossible (probably entirely impossible) for $NEO to create a public blockchain based on DBFT (essentially POS+BFT semantically), that keeps the same encryption signatures (which are probably the only ones that will reliably serve the purpose of crypto where collision resistance must be all but a guarantee)."
dBFT cannot be equated to PoS + BFT as none of those are delegate-centered protocols. How was 1000 TPS thoroughly debunked? With the neo-sharp implementation and Akka being launched, I don't see a reason for dBFT to not be able to surpass 1,000 TPS during peak loads (not during sustained loads though). The excerpt about the collision resistance of "encryption signatures" (?) makes no sense to me.
Here are the promised screenshots of our conversation:
Screenshot 1

Screenshot 2

Screenshot 3
P.S. It is sad to see the so-called "researchers" attracting a mass following despite being clueless about the technology they are trying to review.

submitted by toghrulmaharramov to NEO [link] [comments]

IOTA Definition

IOTA Definition
History of IOTA
The blockchain was announced in October 2015 through. The roots of IOTA go back to the Jinn project. That project aimed to develop ternary hardware or low-cost and energy-efficient hardware, primarily general-purpose processors, for use in the IoT ecosystem. Jinn held a crowd sale for its tokens in September 2014. The Jinn tokens were soon in hot water because they marketed as profit-sharing tokens.. In 2015, Jinn was rebranded as IOTA, and another token sale was held. This time around, the tokens were marketed as utility tokens, and Jinn token holders could exchange their tokens at equivalency with the new blockchain. According to David Sønstebø, IOTA was “spawned” due to the Jinn project. But reports state that a snapshot of the genesis transaction is yet to be found online. These tokens were dispersed to other “founder” addresses. The total number of mIOTAs planned to be in existence is 27 quadrillion. According to IOTA’s founders, the total number of mIOTAs fits in “nicely” with the maximum allowable integer value in Javascript, a programming language.
Understanding IOTA
According to research firm Gartner, there will be 20.4 billion devices connected to the Internet by 2020. Within this ecosystem, each device will exchange data and payment information with multiple, other devices in transactions conducted throughout the day. IOTA intends to become the standard mode of conducting transactions on devices. Its founders have described the ledger as a “public permission-less backbone for the Internet of Things that enables interoperability between multiple devices.” In simple words, this means that it will enable transactions between connected devices, and anyone will be able to access it. Those problems are primarily caused due to a backlog of transactions on Bitcoin’s blockchain. The backlog itself is because of a variety of reasons, from small block sizes to the difficulty of puzzles that miners must solve to earn the cryptocurrency as a reward. IOTA solves these problems by reconfiguring blockchain's architecture into Tangle, a new way of organizing data and confirming transactions.
How Does IOTA Solve Bitcoin’s Scalability Problems?
IOTA’s solution to Bitcoin’s problems is to do away with several key concepts and topographical constraints of a blockchain. mIOTA, IOTA’s cryptocurrency, is pre-mined and consensus of transactions occurs differently as compared to a blockchain. IOTA developers have proposed a new data structure. Tangle is a Decentralized Acyclic Graph, a system of nodes which is not sequential. Thus, each node can be connected to multiple other nodes in a Tangle. But they are connected only in a particular direction, meaning that a node cannot refer back to itself. A standard blockchain is also a DAG because it is a sequential linked set. In Bitcoin, a group of systems running full nodes that contain the entire history of transactions for a ledger are required for confirmations and consensus. Full node miners are not required in Tangle. Each new transaction is confirmed by referencing two previous transactions, reducing the amount of time and memory required to confirm a transaction. Related to the concept of a “confidence” is a transaction’s weight. As it moves through Tangle, a transaction gathers weight. A transaction’s weight increases with the number of approvals. Once a transaction is confirmed, it is broadcast to the entire network, and another unconfirmed transaction can choose the newly-confirmed transaction as one of the tips to confirm itself.
Governance Protocol
IOTA has not outlined a governance structure for its blockchain. The IOTA Foundation is primarily responsible for funding and leading development of IOTA. In a previous post, John Licciardello, former managing director of IOTA's Ecosystem Development Fund (EDF), that would allow members of the IOTA community to vote on proposals regarding its future direction. But there are no updates on the initiative yet.
Concerns About IOTA
Criticism of IOTA has mainly centered around its technical flaws. As with most cryptocurrencies, IOTA’s system is nascent and unproven. A phishing attack on its network resulted in the theft of mIOTA worth $3.94 million. In other words, they created their encryption scheme from scratch, forgoing the widely-used SHA-256 hash function used in Bitcoin. The team at MIT’s Digital Currency Initiative found serious vulnerabilities with IOTA’s hash function, which is called Curl. This property is known as Collision and denotes a broken hash function. In their analysis of the vulnerability, the MIT team stated that a bad actor could have destroyed or stolen user funds from Tangle with their technique. IOTA’s team has corrected the vulnerability. The foundation announced a new partnership with Ledger, one of the leading producers of hardware wallets. IOTA technology will be integrated into the hardware wallets, giving users the ability to store the private key information in a device that adds another layer of protection from hackers.
https://preview.redd.it/ex768bb74gw31.jpg?width=777&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=4e89f0875410274a85b76227c17d321b5c3d29ed
“The collaboration between the teams created an immediate synergy concentrated on developing a compatibility feature allowing users to access, store and manage IOTA tokens on Ledger devices. 

The IOTA (MIOTA) digital asset suffered from a lack of adequate wallets for months, even at the peak of the market. The asset, which commanded prices above $5, was not spared by the bear market. Despite the launch of the long-awaited Trinity wallet, MIOTA lost positions. Given that mIOTA, the crypto used in IOTA, is still to gain mainstream traction, its claims to eliminate scalability problems for blockchains through the use of DAGs are also still to be proven. Vitalik Buterin, the co-founder of Ethereum, has cast doubt on the ability of hashgraphs to solve scalability issues.
Another problem with IOTA currently is the small size of its network. Researchers have found that hackers need only gain control of 33% of the total hashing power required to bring it down. In Bitcoin, control of 51% of a network is required to bring its blockchain down. To ensure security, IOTA’s network currently uses a central server known as a Coordinator to process transactions. This practice has diluted its claims of being a decentralized system since the introduction of a Coordinator has resulted in the introduction of a single point of failure.
The consensus system is described in a new white paper. In the past, IOTA has been criticized for its hidden centralization, as well as for the loss of coins sometimes happening when a user’s wallet was unable to receive its previous balances from the state of the Tangle.
But despite the innovation, IOTA lags behind digital assets that are receiving the most significant inflows of investment and trading liquidity.
submitted by Avra11 to u/Avra11 [link] [comments]

Overview of Major Risks of Buying Nyancoins - Version 5

This is the fifth version of the NYAN risks document (based on v4 (v3 , v2 and original). These are obsoleted periodically as the old ones get archived to allow for comments again via a new post, to re-examine the risks in light of changes, and for greater visibility.
The purpose of these documents is to provide a best-effort discussion of major risk factors in gambling on NYAN, modeled on the risks disclosure in a 10k (annual report) which is mandated for publicly traded companies in the United States. This document is provided with no guarantee that major risk factors have not been missed, and it is important to recognize my (coinaday) personal bias from holding about one-third of the total supply of NYAN.
Please comment on any risks which are not mentioned here or additional aspects of risks here you think should be further emphasized or any other possible disclosure you think would be helpful to a person considering gambling on NYAN.
Executive summary
Nyancoins have no core developer at the moment, uncertain demand, are traded actively on only one exchange, have had inconsistent blocks, are very vulnerable to 51% attacks, have the potential for serious bugs, an uncertain legal situation, concentrated ownership, low liquidity, depend upon the Internet, may be addictive, and could make you wealthy, which has been alleged to lead to more problems.
Introduction: This is my best attempt to collect every major risk factor from buying Nyancoins, although I can offer no warranty of fitness for this information for any purposes. I believe in honesty and forthrightness. Having this available and obvious is a simple matter of basic decency. Much, hopefully all, of this information has been discussed previously in /nyancoins, but this document in particular is about being up-to-date and central. This page will be updated clearly as appropriate if situations change on a best-effort basis (which may mean updates do not happen for months at times, unfortunately; please ping for faster updates).
If you believe that I am missing something, please note any other major risks you see in the comments.
Core developer: Although we have good general tech support in this community and have put up supporting infrastructure, there is not anyone officially currently working on core client code. This is a significant problem for the long-term, although we are not in any immediate known need of changes.
ImASharkRawwwr has returned to the community and may do future client updates, but I'm leaving the lack of core developer risk unchanged until there is an update released. This is not intended as a slight in any way but merely being cautious in the risks document and recognizing that we aren't certain when or if there will be a next release.
Demand: NYAN was introduced in 2014 and during the second half of that year had so little demand that it almost died out. In January 2015 I got involved in the coin and for most of 2015 and 2016 I was the majority of the buying pressure. I base these statements on my recollection of the trading history so far and the fact that I have acquired more than 120 million coins, somewhere around 41% of the coins (latest hodling report, June 2017), as well as my observations that I had usually had the leading major bid, and usually the leading bid regardless of size.
In 2017, I have generally not been a major factor in the demand, as I haven’t had money to spare to gamble on NYAN. In June 2017, we have had a spike in buying from an unknown source.
It is unknown whether significant demand for NYAN will continue. Because its value is purely speculative, it is entirely possible that demand for NYAN could simply end. This is a fundamental risk in gambling on NYAN; it is entirely possible that its value will go to zero and not recover.
Exchanges:
Trade Satoshi is currently the only exchange for Nyancoins with significant volume. If Trade Satoshi were to fail somehow, it is likely that this would have significant consequences for Nyancoins.
Previously we traded on Cryptopia and prior to that on Cryptsy. Both exchanges failed. This is a further reminder that exchanges are a major risk and one should be extremely careful to not keep more coins on there than one can comfortably afford to lose.
In theory, there are decentralized exchange technologies, notably CATE; however, I think we currently lack some needed APIs for this. I'm not certain but we haven't demonstrated the capability yet. On-Reddit exchanges are also possible with tipbots, but require trust as they are not atomic. It should be possible to build an "exchangebot" similarly, although I'm not currently aware of one, but my concept would still have the bot as a trusted central party.
Atomic cross-chain transactions seem to me like a very promising core technology ultimately for building exchanges which can be more proveably secure. They could also allow exchanges to share a common listing protocol as well without having to trust the other exchanges (at least, beyond the core protocol development and maintenance; tanstaafl). This is not yet accomplished though and in the meantime we remain vulnerable to periodic exchange failures.
Inconsistent blocks:
Although NYAN is designed to produce a block every minute, there have been times where there has been more than 24 hours between blocks. This results because of an imperfect difficulty function and low base hashing, along with price fluctuations, which can combine to have a low difficulty making the coin attractive for a flood of hashing power which can lead the difficulty function to overcompensate, leaving it stuck with a high difficulty no longer profitable to mine.
I haven’t observed this lately, that is, I don’t recall incidents of this in 2017, but I’ve been paying far less attention to it as well. It is entirely possible for this to recur, as the difficulty function is not fixed (it would require a hard fork to fix it). We seem to have more baseline hashing which helps to avoid this, but it is possible for us to lose that.
A workaround is to use large transaction fees (I've set my client to 337 NYAN) which is enough to cause pools to generally solve a block even if the chain were otherwise stuck. It may be possible to include a better difficulty function in a hard fork client, but it is unknown when if ever this would be done and it's not yet clear what design improvement if any would fix this.
51% attack: Because of the generally quite low hashing power on NYAN, it is highly vulnerable to a 51% attack. Either a leading pool or a new one could choose to do a denial-of-service attack, whether for extortion, lulz, or some other reason (like coinaday being annoying). Such an attack is capable of preventing any transaction processing for as long as it is sustained. I consider this a relatively low risk since I expect we would simply wait it out (and potentially not even notice such an attack for quite a while given the low volume of transactions currently), but it is definitely a potential vulnerability.
Bugs: It is possible that there are bugs in the underlying code. I have never read through all of the bitcoin or nyancoin code, of any version, nor even studied the original bitcoin whitepaper in depth (by the way, we oughta make up a nyancoin whitepaper or ten someday), meaning I have no professional or technical knowledge about whether or not the system is fundamentally sound. I've been going based on "it seems to be working, so it's probably fine", which is, shall we say, more of an engineering than scientific approach.
I have heard reference to a "time warp" bug vulnerability in the KGW difficulty function which Nyancoins has. I do not know details and my understanding is a fix to this would require a fork to change the difficulty function, so I do not anticipate a fix before NYAN3, the term for an eventual hard fork, but it is unknown when if ever this would be done. I consider this vulnerability to be likely to be related to the fundamental weakness to difficulty spikes after large amounts of hashing jumps on the network. Hostile (or simply passing interest with large capacity) hashing does degrade the performance of the network. As a workaround, this class of attack can be mitigated with a transaction to 'unstick' the chain after, since the difficulty function will adjust in the next block after enough wall-time has passed since the last block (so only need one high difficulty solve which can be triggered by a transaction fee).
Legal: Bitcoin faces uncertain legal situations in almost every country. Nyancoin is even more uncertain, as people tend to consider bitcoin and not address impacts on altcoins. Between the potential tax implications and banking regulations and currency laws, there are a wide variety of ways a person could make a felony-level mistake. This can be somewhat mitigated by merely buying and holding, as you won't be responsible for KYC/AML presumably (although an argument could be made in your purchase), and presumably unrealized capital gains wouldn't be taxable (but I am neither a lawyer nor accountant nor any sort of expert on the relevant accounting laws in any country).
Somehow getting legal opinions for Nyancoins in every country would be very useful in my opinion. If Bitcoin and altcoins are well-studied in a given country it should be relatively easy to adapt those opinions and research to Nyancoins, but it would still require some pro bono work in any case. So...hopefully we'll get some lawyer Nekonauts someday who are willing to semi-officially give us an opinion. In the meantime...hope that common sense can save you. If you sell Nyancoins directly, you're going to need to comply with the KYC/AML types of laws of your country. If you're going to do banking operations...may the central bank have mercy on your soul.
I think the best advantage we have is the same bitcoin had for its first years: we're too small for anyone to care. But since we plan to grow significantly, we need to be aware of our legal issues upon scale. Which is to say, whether or not you're allowed to sell 10,000 NYAN to your friend probably has a lot to do with whether your friend legally acquired whatever is being offered in exchange, and whether the value of what you get in return is above a certain level or not. I'm not going to try guessing that level precisely because I know I'll be wrong. $1 is probably fine. $10,000 is probably illegal without some significant licensing. I would suggest either not touching fiat or else deliberately capping it without verification after getting an independent local expert legal opinion.
concentration: The fact that I hold about 41%(? not sure the exact percentage as of Dec 2017 ; need to do updated survey to check; 41% sounds slightly high to me but I'll see...I'll try to update by the end of the year or shortly after) of the currently outstanding NYAN could be a major risk factor, particularly if I do not act in the best long-term interests of the strength of Nyancoins. For instance, I could pull my bids, sell only a small part of my holdings, crash the market, and potentially buy a lot of volume for a lower price. While I cannot foresee any circumstance under which I would do this, it is certainly conceivable that I could be financially, legally, or morally obligated to do so if I were to become insolvent.
Liquidity: There is very little trading activity in NYAN. Therefore, large purchases will drive the price up and large sales will drive the price down. This means that entering and exiting a position is likely to result in "slippage", so even if the price has increased slightly overall since the time before one entered a position to the time before one exits it, it is quite possible that the overall trade will be neutral or negative as a result of the pressure on the market. For an extreme example, my own position would be essentially impossible to exit from the market without crashing the price, and even so it would likely be difficult to find buyers even at a satoshi, based on that I currently am the majority of the bids on the market. This is closely tied to the concentration risk but if I were to exit NYAN for any reason or simply fail to continue to renew bids the liquidity would dry up even further.
Internet outage: if the Internet goes down, we hit a very nasty scenario. We can't process transactions, and all the miners go into a race to make 'useless' blocks on their own. If the Internet were never to come back up, Nyancoins would be dead. If there is a daylong internet outage, the longest blockchain discovered after, presumably representing the most hashing power dedicated to empty blocks during that outage, will win. So I suppose the block rewards in that case are for having the faith in Nyancoins to keep hashing and storing the blockchain during the day without the Internet.
addictive: This was a curiosity to me when I started. Now it's an obsession for me. I'm constantly thinking about how I can help to smooth the path for Nyancoins to grow stronger and better and more valuable. You may find that once you start to realize the impact you can have upon Nyancoins, and that Nyancoins can have upon you, that you start to become addicted as well. It is possible to substitute another addiction in its place, such as dogecoins or pcp, but it is not recommended.
Nyancoin addictions are considered 'mostly harmless'. The exception is if you go 'full coinaday' and start to accumulate more than 10% of your assets in Nyancoins. In this, this is essentially a variety of gambling addiction. I would argue that it beats roulette because you can tilt the odds in your favor, but then, I would argue that, wouldn't I?
mo' nyan mo' problems: Some people have claimed that more money leads to more problems. Since nyan is money, it follows as a consequence of the conjecture. Should this be the case, your increasing nyan could potentially lead to such problems in the future as: enhanced attention from revenue collection services of all kinds (governmental and private), swarms of fake friends and gold-diggers, excessive risk-taking as a result of feelings of invincibility, an increase in certain varieties of targeted marketing, possible disqualification for asset-based welfare for you (or even your children, for instance college financial assistance), an inability to remember how many houses you own, or other serious problems.
Conclusion
There are a variety of different risks in buying Nyancoins. I believe the most serious one is the developer issue. If those of us who have found or come back to NYAN abandon it, it could die. Otherwise, I consider the risks generally manageable, but exchange failure or a currently unknown bug could do serious damage to the ecosystem as well.
This self-certified infallible message has been brought to you as a Public Service Announcement of the NYAN Public Relations Council, a transparent front organization of notoriously lovable philanthropist and major NYAN hodler coinaday.
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BTC is going down. Start of the retracement. Why Bitcoin Keeps Falling Down? 'Fake Bitcoin' - How this Woman Scammed the World, then ... Bitcoin Predictions for 2015 Bitcoin's Future is Bright While Fed Prints $6 Trillion to Bail Out

When Bitcoin plunged to $200 in 2015, the Puell Multiple briefly entered the buy zone. BTC rallied thousands of percent in the years that followed. And when BTC hit $3,150 at the end of 2018, the buy zone was breached by the indicator yet again. This historical precedent suggests that Bitcoin will soon enter begin a longer-term uptrend. Bitcoin price and Puell Multiple chart from Glassnode Far ... Difficulty. A mechanism for regulating the time it takes to mine a block. What is the difficulty? The difficulty is a number that regulates how long it takes for miners to add new blocks of transactions to the blockchain.. This difficulty value updates every 2 weeks to ensure that it takes 10 minutes (on average) to add a new block to the blockchain. The value of a bitcoin is dependent on a high difficulty, and the mining difficulty is dependent on a high price. With a few exceptions, like the recent exponential efficiency gains from improved hardware, the bitcoin value and mining difficulty will both go up, or both go down, but they will not separate, at least for very long. Views: 6,574 As mining difficulty goes down, this is the best time to start mining Bitcoin. With smaller competition, resilient miners can mine more Bitcoin per fixed unit of power than before. Digital money that’s instant, private, and free from bank fees. Download our official wallet app and start using Bitcoin today. Read news, start mining, and buy BTC or BCH.

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BTC is going down. Start of the retracement.

Onecoin promised the world, but only proved to be a trail of destruction. --- About ColdFusion --- ColdFusion is an Australian based online media company ind... 2007. Japan. The mysterious man named Satoshi Nakamoto starts working on his new bold idea – a concept of bitcoin. When it appeared, nobody knew how huge it'll become. The first bitcoin purchase ... What is Bitcoin's "hashrate", and just what does it actually mean? Is there a reason that a greater hashrate is more desirable and what happens when the rate goes down? In this video, shot in ... In this episode we will look at the retracement of the crypto market. THe BTC Price is going down in 3rd consecutive day. BUT the price will form a golden cross at very soon! Copy-trade best ... So, we don’t know how bitcoin is going to perform in the down cycle. We have some sense of how other asset classes do so that’s one problem. We have some sense of how other asset classes do so ...

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